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Abstract 
 
This Master’s thesis conceptualises and analyses the concept of neo-colonialism in the 
context of China-Africa relations, with an emphasis on Zimbabwe. The thesis is built on 
examples of cooperation between China and Africa, and then China and Zimbabwe, in 
order to understand the role of China’s foreign policy in Africa as a whole and in 
Zimbabwe in particular. First, the methodology will be explained, and then a theoretical 
framework will be offered for geopolitics of resources, followed by outlining the theory 
of neo-colonialism before empirical evidence on the Sino-Africa cooperation is offered. 
The following five variables: development cooperation, market and resource seeking, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), infrastructure projects and soft power, will be 
considered in a pan-African and then Zimbabwe-specific context with evidence from 
local and international media, academic journals, government reports and policies, 
publicly available data, think tanks and international organisations. Then, the role of 
Africa in China’s foreign policy will be assessed based on these five variables and 
empirical findings. Finally, concluding remarks will determine the extent to which the 
following neo-colonial characteristics are present in China’s activities in Africa as a 
whole and Zimbabwe in specific: (1) noticeable asymmetry in the relationship; (2) a 
degree of agency from the colonised state; (3) multiple entities to carry out business and 
other activities, including the state, private- and state-owned businesses and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs); (4) no assumption of a former colonial 
relationship; (5) multiple areas of spreading influence, including economics, culture, 
education and other soft power areas. The extent of these in Africa and in Zimbabwe in 
particular will be assessed using the five independent variables before making 
conclusive remarks.  
 
Keywords: neo-colonialism, geopolitics of resources, China, Africa, Zimbabwe. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has in recent years found itself heavily criticised 
for its interest in the African continent. China’s presence in Africa has been described as 
a ‘scramble,’ ‘mad dash,’ ‘resource grab,’ and even ‘rape.’ All these derogatory and 
submissive terms create an image of a helpless African population, who are passively 
submitting to yet another external power and portray China as an insatiable hegemon. 
The Chinese are branded selfish with their incessant quest for natural resources, which 
is damaging Africa’s fragile efforts to improve governance and build a sustainable 
future for themselves. Chinese presence in Africa is assessed on the presumption that 
the warm relations between the Asian giant and the African continent are solely founded 
on China’s need to access Africa’s natural resources. On other occasions, however, the 
Chinese are seen benevolent and their contribution to a foundation for long-term 
economic development through infrastructure projects, revenue and jobs creation is seen 
as a new approach to development. Only a handful of studies (Brautigam 2009, Park 
2015, Moyo 2009, Rich and Recker 2013) place Sino-African relations within a greater 
historical context, which allows observers to see the Sino-African relationship as 
mutually constructed and dynamic, instead of focusing solely on what China receives or 
extracts from various African nations. While it is important to look at China’s Africa 
Policy and consider the overall history and impact of these two giants, I contest the 
analyses of China and Africa, as if they were relationships between two countries, 
instead of one and fifty-four. In reality, the relationship between China and Africa is 
much more complex and categorising the Chinese as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ for Africa without 
delving into various aspects of engagement between the two would be short-sighted. 
China has diverse strategies in several African countries and vice versa – some African 
countries are much more open to Chinese investment than others.   
 
Bearing in mind the differences and various possibilities of engagement with the fifty-
four countries of Africa, the current thesis aims to bring an understanding of the scope 
of Chinese activities in Africa and analyse the instruments China uses to engage with 
the continent as a whole. From this stems the first research question:  
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1. Which economical and soft power instruments are used by China to engage with 
African countries? 
 
The answer to this question will aim to configure the role of Chinese foreign policy in 
Africa by analysing the following Chinese foreign policy instruments as independent 
variables: development cooperation, infrastructure projects, market and resource 
seeking, FDI and soft power. These will give the reader a wider basis on which to see 
the Sino-African relationship and grasp the many ways China does business, seeks to 
influence and reap gains from African countries. Then, using the same variables, the 
relationship between China and Zimbabwe will be analysed. Sino-Zimbabwe historical 
ties, their mutual relationship, Zimbabwe’s policies and Chinese activities in the country 
will be considered in order to understand how China’s relationship with Zimbabwe 
differs from its relationship with other African countries. Thus the second research 
question: 
 
2. What are the similarities and differences of China-Zimbabwe relationship to 
China’s relationship with Africa as a whole? 
 
Finally, the theory of neo-colonialism will be applied to China’s relationship with 
Africa with an aim to determine the scope, terms and instruments of China’s 
engagement with the African continent, and to gauge China’s role in Africa. Hence the 
third research question: 
 
3. To what extent does the relationship between China and Africa have neo-
colonial characteristics? 
 
The answers to these questions are complex and multi-faceted and the relationship is not 
always transparent. The growth in Chinese political, economic and social activities in 
the African continent has generated a flood of literature, which can broadly be divided 
into two distinctive genres. The first stream sees the PRC as a threat to the interests of 
both African countries and the international community, because of China’s alleged role 
in supporting corrupt African leaders, preventing the spread of good governance in the 
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region and its hunger for natural resources. Some see China as the new colonial power 
in Africa, making many African countries puppet states whose economic choices 
depend on Chinese investment and where China is helping sustain pariah regimes, who 
appropriate money from their own population. The second group of works engages in 
myth-busting and putting the Chinese foreign policy and activities in Africa in context 
in specific regions and countries. Those partaking in this line of thinking do not see the 
Chinese as bearing the sole responsibility for Africa’s problems, they acknowledge that 
eradicating poverty, bad governance and corruption must come from inside Africa and 
cannot be successfully enforced by China or any other state. These works outline cases, 
where Western countries have similarly invested in rogue regimes in Africa, and bring 
out the positive projects Chinese aid and investment have enabled in a number of 
African countries. Taking accounts of both the views described above, this thesis aims 
to reach an informed conclusion on the extent of China’s neo-colonialism on the 
African continent and in Zimbabwe. In addition to that, both negative and positive 
aspects of Chinese engagement on the continent, the history of China in Africa and 
opinions from the West, China and Africa will be considered when analysing the 
independent variables. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1. Empirical data 
 
The primary objective of this research paper is to conceptualise the notion of neo-
colonialism, and use the subsequent theoretical framework to understand how and why 
China engages with Africa, and the scope of these activities in order to scale the 
Chinese neo-colonialism on the continent. There is a substantial body of literature on 
neo-colonialism in relation to China’s activities and role in Africa, hence a research 
based on existing literature has been considered sufficient to cover the scope of this 
thesis. This will be done through analysing quantitative and qualitative data made 
available by various academic journals, Chinese, Zimbabwean, European Union (EU), 
and various NGO and think tank papers. Apart from the officially available data, a 
number of newspaper reports and speeches by Chinese officials, African and Western 
leaders will be considered to gain a better understanding of the atmosphere surrounding 
China’s relationship with Africa.   
 
Some of the literature available is more objective and nuanced than others, some 
concentrate on a region, some on a country, some on an industry. In order to get a full 
picture, this thesis includes a range of books, reports and articles, which have all been 
critically considered to enable a conclusion, which takes into account different 
perspectives and opinions. An important foundation and a source of information for this 
thesis are Deborah Brautigam’s reports and books, which give the reader an in depth 
view of China’s historical and contemporary activities in Africa, including Zimbabwe. 
Brautigam is known as one of the primary defenders of Chinese activities in Africa and 
is often referenced in works that divulge into myth busting in this topic. She provides a 
very detailed story on the relationship and looks into a number of aspects that constitute 
China-Africa politics.  
 
A number of other academic sources have been used, especially journals concerned with 
area studies and contemporary Chinese politics. These include papers by Chinese, 
Zimbabwean and Western authors in order to get the views from all sides and make 
informed conclusions. European Union and African Union policy papers have also been 
analysed along with Chinese policy and white papers that have been made available to 
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the public. In addition to this, news articles and reports from Chinese state-run media 
enterprise Xinhua and various Zimbabwean newspapers have been used in the 
background research and to get a feel of the opinions on the ground. The majority of the 
Western media reports are from UK broadsheet newspapers, given the country’s 
increased interest in Zimbabwe as a former colony.  
 
2.2. Delimitations 
 
China in Africa is a colossal topic, which is filled with a number of issues to explore, 
but in order to keep the scope of this thesis as limited and focused as possible, and 
considering the resources available, the notion of neo-colonialism with a specific focus 
on Zimbabwe has been chosen. This choice was made as the term ‘neo-colonial power’ 
is finding increasing use in academia as well as mainstream media and is regularly 
attributed to Chinese activities in Africa. As a result, there is a popular opinion as 
portrayed in the media and heard from prominent opinion leaders in the West as well as 
Africa that China is prolonging Africa’s problems, and in some cases is even to be 
blamed for Africa’s troubles. However, the objective is not to find a scapegoat for 
Africa’s problems, but to show the extent of Chinese activities in Africa with an aim to 
achieve a balanced argument, which will enable making intelligent conclusions. The 
term ‘Africa’ covers a wide range of differences among the fifty-four countries that 
make up the continent, so addressing a specific country will yield a more detailed and 
focused research. The same goes for generalising ‘China’ and its activities in Africa. In 
order to avoid this, this thesis will explore the various ways in which China engages 
with Africa and support these claims with examples from different countries, industries 
and areas.   
 
One of the biggest limitations is the lack of governance and reporting on projects in 
Africa, including Zimbabwe, which means some data may be missing or some numbers 
may be increased or decreased. Corruption in these countries affects how much of the 
funds aimed at development projects or invested in Africa actually reach the intended 
projects and how much goes in the pockets of the political elites. There is also very little 
information on deals done between local African leaders and Chinese state owned 
	 12	
and/or private firms, which poses another limitation. A well-known feature of China’s 
development cooperation is that its exact volume is not revealed and the terms of 
agreement remain undisclosed, which is also a significant data limitation. The lack of 
transparency in transactions has created confusion, both inside and outside China, about 
how to distinguish between foreign aid and FDI. Beijing encourages government 
agencies and commercial entities to closely combine foreign aid, direct investment, 
service contracts, labour cooperation, foreign trade and export, which further blur the 
distinction between aid and investment. 
 
I will use the largest public database of Chinese development finance in Africa - Aid 
Data - in order to provide an acceptable analysis of Chinese development finance to 
Zimbabwe. This is a collaborative online platform that makes data on Chinese 
development finance flows to Africa more accessible by sharing, synthesising and 
standardising diverse sources of development finance, such as information from 
journalists, scholars, government officials, business professionals and local community 
leaders. The database details almost 1700 projects in 50 countries between 2000 and 
2011 (Provost and Harris 2013). Since it is not possible to find 100% accurate data on 
this issue, the database will be used in addition to reports from international NGOs and 
think tanks, Chinese and Zimbabwean government reports, academic journals and local 
and international media. 
 
Another data limitation in qualitative research on the topic of China in Africa is bias in 
reporting. A large chunk of the media in Zimbabwe is government controlled and 
journalists are easily bought and/or intimidated into writing what is favourable for the 
government. The non-government controlled media on the other hand, is differently 
biased and sometimes prone to blow things out of proportion in order to damage the 
ruling regime. At the same time, the Chinese government and state-controlled media 
reports may not provide the full picture, either. Chinese aid and involvement in Africa is 
normally portrayed as a selfless act of help to the downtrodden, making China a heroic 
and resourceful nation, who are able to help those in need. As such, these reports, 
articles and studies have been approached with a slight sense of scepticism, but not 
forgetting that this style of reporting, true or not, says a lot about the countries involved.  
	 13	
2.3. Case selection  
2.3.1. Why China?  
 
A number of observers - academic, political and media – have warned of the inherent 
dangers the Chinese model of engagement poses to the African continent. Tiffen (2014) 
warns African states of the risks associated with the Chinese model of engagement, in 
particular of the imbalance in trade. This means that countries, who concentrate on 
producing one commodity are being held hostage by Chinese high demand and low 
prices. This affects Angola and Nigeria, who export most of their oil to China, Côte 
d’Ivoire with their cocoa production, Namibia’s fishing industry, Zambia’s copper 
mining and Zimbabwe’s diamond mining. French (2014) similarly condemns the 
Chinese business model; moreover, he cautions both the African and Chinese leaders, 
who are at the forefront of making trade deals, to watch out for the increasingly active 
African civil society, who are demanding information about where the billions given by 
China have really gone. This engagement has been labelled a new form of colonialism, 
economic colonialism, neo-colonialism and neo-paternalism, but there are very few 
studies focusing on what exactly these terms mean. Even fewer studies are 
concentrating on the benefits of Chinese involvement in Africa for Africa and few 
succeed in applying a different stance on China other than a greedy, resource-hungry, 
exploitative superpower. Yet when Sautman & Hairong (2009) asked the explicit 
question of whether China is practicing a form of neo-colonialism, African survey 
respondents overwhelmingly rejected the notion. Moyo (2012) is one of the few African 
commentators that sees China’s interests in Africa as quite pure. She believes leaders in 
Beijing need to keep economic growth rates high and continue to bring people out of 
poverty in order to prevent a crisis of legitimacy for their rule. To do so, China needs 
arable land, oil and minerals, yet she maintains that colonial ambitions are not in sync 
with China’s current thinking and that the Chinese are largely welcomed by the African 
public. 
 
It is compelling to discover what else China is doing in Africa apart from the widely 
reported land appropriation, involvement in resource expropriation, supporting pariah 
regimes and building roads to make their businesses in Africa run smoother. China is a 
changing country, its privately owned enterprises (POEs) have a lot more freedom to 
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operate than is commonly known and the majority of them are not in Africa to feed 
China’s resource hunger, but to look for new markets. Considering more than the need 
for resources and market expansion paints a very different picture of China in Africa 
and allows seeing the relationship from a less hostile angle. At the same time, when 
looking at how forcefully China has established itself in Africa in recent years, it is 
difficult to see it as anything else but a form of neo-colonialism. 
 
2.3.2. Why Zimbabwe? 
 
Zimbabwe, once known as the breadbasket of Africa, has been in the international 
media for everything but success stories in the past 16 years. The country’s radical land 
reform in 2000, which misplaced thousands of people and lead the country on a 
downward spiral, led by the infamous 92-year old Robert Mugabe, is seen by many as 
the primary cause for the country’s misfortunes. The EU and the USA met Mugabe’s 
reform with disregard and economic sanctions, so he turned his gaze towards the East 
and adopted a Look East Policy. Zimbabwe is the only African country that has an 
official Look East policy and which has signed a number of favourable trade and 
cooperation agreements with China. The country is also known for its human rights 
abuses, corruption and massive diamond, copper, gold and bauxite reserves, which all 
add fuel to the fire. Western media has painted a picture of a great Chinese-
Zimbabwean friendship, which only benefits the ruling elite, leaving the majority of the 
country suffering poverty, hunger and lack of choices. However, many are unaware of 
the two countries’ long history of friendship, dating back to Zimbabwe’s freedom fight 
against the minority white rule. Observers and media don’t always report the bigger 
picture, which also includes the shortcomings of the Zimbabwean government, which is 
the vehicle China is using to make its gains from the resource-rich country. In spite of 
enthusiastic cooperation from the Zimbabwean government, it is clear that China has 
more say in the relationship and therefore makes more gains. The historical relationship 
between the two, however, has always been friendly, which makes this case slightly 
different from many other African states. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
This thesis is framed by two concepts, which are most often applied to the Chinese 
involvement in Africa: geopolitics of resources and neo-colonialism. The two go hand-
in-hand and must be seen as interwoven as both are concerned with the economics of 
sustaining a population’s resource need and the subjugation of less powerful countries 
through various means. Over the past 50 years, the concept of neo-colonialism has 
become central to the debate amongst politicians, academia, media and activists in order 
to explain and sometimes condemn on-going dependences of former colonies. Yet there 
is no consensus on its exact meaning and its conceptualisation lacks theoretical depth. 
Neo-colonialism was first broadly theorised as a further development of capitalism that 
enables capitalist powers to dominate subject nations through the operations in 
international capitalism rather than by means of direct rule. This chapter starts with the 
conceptualisation of resource geopolitics in the context of China in Africa to be 
followed by the review of the most important understandings and the history of the 
concept of neo-colonialism.  
 
3.1. Geopolitics of resources 
 
The quest for alternative sources of energy and favourable access to them is driving 
many growing economies to seek political and strategic partnerships far afield and 
China is perhaps at the forefront of such explorations, especially with its growing 
interest in African and South American states and their natural resources. In fact, the so 
called Chinese neo-colonialism is most often associated with extractive industries, 
implying that China is using its economic power to ‘steal’ resources from Africa to be 
used for the advancement of China while Africa makes little gains from its own riches. 
Consequently, Africa’s resource wealth is often termed a ‘resource-curse’ as these 
riches have not proven to benefit the African people as a whole, yet have filled the 
pockets of several government officials. Geopolitics of resources is thus a valuable view 
to be used in conjunction with neo-colonialism in order to provide a supporting 
theoretical framework to neo-colonialism as it is used today. Both the concepts of 
geopolitics of resources and neo-colonialism are closely linked to energy and natural 
resources security, hence a detailed understanding of both is necessary in order to make 
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informed conclusions and understand the rationale behind a country’s resource-search 
abroad, which might warrant them the label of a neo-colonial power. Power et al (2012) 
argue that there are three interlinked reasons for countries seeking resources elsewhere: 
(a) fossil fuels and minerals are distributed unevenly around the world, making some 
regions more resource-rich than others; (b) these resources are critically important for 
global economic development and growth and are valuable internationally traded 
commodities; (c) the anarchic nature of the international political realm means that the 
relative power and behaviour of states tend to determine political and economic 
outcomes more than regional and international governance institutions and international 
law.  
 
China’s growing hunger for resources and increasing presence on the African continent 
is often used to illustrate these three points, especially after China’s distancing from 
Middle Eastern oil producers after 9/11 and moving towards Angola and Nigeria as its 
biggest oil suppliers (Brautigam 2009). Since then, however, Chinese private and 
government-owned companies have got involved in many more industries varying from 
cotton production to diamond mining to retail – all coupled with government policies 
and soft power initiatives. Unlike different branches of the Western governments 
involved in relief, energy procurement or defence, which view Africa largely as a site of 
humanitarian intervention, resource extraction and security threat respectively; the 
Chinese state sees Africa as a whole strategic-economic space, hence a wide-ranging 
Africa policy is required.  
 
Needless to say, Africa is a vast continent with diverse geographic patterns and a 
relatively limited population. The resource base of Africa is enormous, with powerful 
rivers, huge concentrations of strategic minerals, and important petroleum and uranium 
deposits. Nevertheless, it is comprised mainly of developing states, with limited 
capacity and infrastructure. Power and Mohan (2010) consider Western powers largely 
failed in their efforts to do business with Africa and reduce poverty on the continent 
falling victim to Cold War politics, cultural differences and Africa’s colonial heritage. 
Besides, in the light of a much more convenient proposal from China, African leaders 
are no longer keen to satisfy Western conditionalities of governance and human rights 
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with little guaranteed benefit. With African leaders welcoming China as a new 
cooperation partner, Africa is seen by China as a tabula rasa – a blank sheet of 
opportunities, which can help along to China’s ascendance on the international stage 
(Power and Mohan 2010). China has already gained enormous support from African 
states for its One China policy, which interestingly is a condition of Chinese aid, and 
has isolated Taiwan from any closer cooperation with African countries.  
 
China’s transformation from a peripheral, isolated, agrarian society into a major 
economic force and a key player in the global economy has generated a voracious 
appetite for energy sources, raw materials and other critical resources to sustain its 
economic growth, thus much of China’s foreign policy is driven by the need to establish 
ownership and control over these resources in addition to the country’s desire to be seen 
as a considerable force on the international arena. Africa presents a perfect opportunity 
for China to satisfy the needs of its large economy. To illustrate this, Carmody and 
Owusu (2007) identified six elements of China’s geo-economic strategy in Africa: (1) to 
ensure access to critical natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, to maintain the 
country’s economic growth; (2) to recycle its massive foreign exchange reserves into 
profitable investments overseas; (3) to facilitate the development of Chinese 
multinational companies; (4) to find new markets for the products of Chinese industry; 
(5) to develop African agriculture in order to provide non-food agricultural products to 
supply Chinese industry and consumers, and food products for China’s growing cities; 
(6) to source knowledge workers from Africa to support Chinese economic 
transformation. 
 
Of course, different African countries have different resource geographies, but an extent 
of the above-mentioned activities can be seen in nearly all African states, which provide 
commodities and resources necessary to fuel China’s ‘peaceful rise.’ Consequently, 
China’s diplomatic goals, its need for natural resources and its relationship with African 
states cannot be seen in isolation or viewed without delving into geo-political 
considerations. Arguably, geopolitics of resources forms the basis of China’s Africa 
policy and is the underlying reason for China’s ever-warmer ‘mutually beneficial’ 
relations with so many African states, but this type of cooperation also has many 
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trappings of neo-colonialism, which paint a different picture of China’s approach to 
Africa.  
 
3.2. Neo-colonialism 
3.2.1. Historical origins 
 
Neo-colonialism is a term that is controversial, over-arching, endowed with rhetorical 
power and hard to define in absolute terms. It is often referred to, but seldom defined, 
thus making the term descriptive rather than analytical. Some authors attribute it to 
Jean-Paul Sartre, a leading figure amongst the Francophone anti-colonial activists, who 
used the phrase in one of his writings in 1964 to describe it as the geopolitical practice 
of using capitalism, business, globalisation and cultural imperialism to influence a 
country. Crozier (1964) saw its origins in Leninism, where it was likewise used to 
describe a new form of domination applied after the colonial period in independent 
states, which relied on economic dependence without the need to actually colonise a 
country.  
 
Neo-colonialism was defined during The All African People’s Conference in early 
1960s as ‘the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political 
independence in emerging countries, which become the victims of an indirect and subtle 
form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means’ 
(Charney 1987). However, the term was only accepted into wider use a couple of years 
later in the works of Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of post-colonial Ghana. He 
described a state under a neo-colonial power as ‘independent and with all the outward 
trappings of international sovereignty, but its economic system and policies directed 
from outside’ (Nkrumah 1965). Rao (2000) suggests that in his publication Nkrumah 
argued that the struggle between classes had now been replaced by a struggle between 
nations, i.e. by an international conflict, where countries are looking for more efficient 
ways to acquire the raw materials and resources their population needs. A more recent 
adherent to a similar understanding of neo-colonialism is Noam Chomsky (1992), 
according to whom the Western capitalist economies fully rely on resources and the 
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manpower from their former colonies, which is why it is essential to preserve their 
dependence even after they gain independence. 
 
Historically, the phrase thus established continuity between colonialism and neo-
colonialism. Neo-colonialism was seen as an adapted form of colonialism, which takes 
advantage of the weakness of the newly decolonised states in order to achieve 
economic, political and cultural benefits. The goal was to maintain the former colonies 
in dependent positions, which would allow economic exploitation, usually in the form 
of natural resource extraction, but also gave a wider audience to sustain the spread of 
the culture of the coloniser and coax the former colonies into partnerships and 
diplomatic agreements, which would benefit the Western powers.  
 
There are various mechanisms to ensure dependence, which were used then and are 
arguably still in use, including control of the prices of primary and manufactured goods, 
the obligation to buy certain amounts of manufactured products from the neo-colonial 
master and to sell a certain quantity of raw materials in exchange for infrastructure 
projects, continuity of aid, favourable trade terms and political patronage in 
international forums. Rodney (1981) illustrates this aptly with the West African cocoa 
industry in the 1960s. During this time, production increased rapidly in many African 
countries due to demand from Europe and North America, which led to overproduction, 
which in turn led to a reduction in the selling price of cocoa worldwide. Neo-colonial 
theorists at the time proclaimed that economies based on the production of cash crops 
could not hope to develop, because the world economic system imposes a ceiling on the 
revenue that can be accrued from their production and so leave the country of origin 
with very small gains from its main source of revenue. The cocoa industry is still often 
used to illustrate corporate neo-colonialism, but an example that has made big waves 
recently is the extraction and export of minerals and oil from Africa, especially from 
countries with fragile and opaque governments, who tend to misappropriate the revenue 
gained from these deals. Moreover, such transactions would not normally serve to 
develop an African economy, because minerals are taken from African soil by foreign-
owned or foreign-funded corporations, shipped to Europe, Asia or America, and turned 
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into manufactured goods, which are then resold to African consumers at value-added 
prices.  
 
This is the economic dependence that anti-colonial thinkers in the 1960s warned 
African states about – independent countries are being taken advantage of because of 
their wealth and their weaknesses by wealthier states that hold a lot more bargaining 
power and can influence decisions in developing states through manipulating aid 
figures, issuing strict immigration rules, job creation and diplomatic meandering. The 
inability of many African economies to develop after independence soon led many of 
them to enlist aid from their former colonial masters and international organisations 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This provided a 
link between independent African governments and the former colonisers and paved 
way for further dependence. Most foreign aid then was provided in the form of loans, 
which bore high interest rates, yet again enslaving the states already stuck in poverty. 
Ergo the repayment of these loans contributed to the underdevelopment of African 
economies, because the collection of interest ultimately impoverished African people. 
These repressive forms of cooperation may seem out-dated now, but they continue to 
form the basis of neo-colonial thought today, with some added characteristics.  
 
3.2.2. Contemporary characteristics 
 
A wide application of any term can cause its abstraction and misuse. As the 
understanding of international and intercontinental relations becomes more and more 
refined, the idea of neo-colonialism will continue to be revisited and further theorised. 
Even though the concept of neo-colonialism is still very similar to what Nkrumah and 
his contemporaries described and many parallels can be drawn with the present day, 
there are some significant additional characteristics that the theory of neo-colonialism 
has acquired since the 1960s.  
 
The most important new feature of neo-colonialist thought is that in its current usage, 
neo-colonialism does not assume a former colonial relationship between the coloniser 
and the colonised. Neither does contemporary neo-colonialism assume land ownership 
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or taking explicit control of a government. However, it does assume a large degree of 
economic control, influence and self-gain, which are achieved mostly remotely and 
peacefully. In fact, a number of international corporate giants and the cooperation 
programmes of international organisations in developing countries are increasingly 
being classified as neo-colonialist powers, therefore being assigned agency similarly to 
states in their neo-colonial practices (Stoneman and Suckling 1987). Alike states, these 
corporations and organisations are accused of neo-colonial practices, looking to expand 
their markets, cut costs and searching for natural resources or diplomatic support in 
international forums. Thus the actors or perpetrators of neo-colonialism are not 
necessarily former hegemons seeking to continue their influence in a more democratic 
way, nor are these actors always states. This leaves observers in a somewhat difficult 
position: determining where normal business relations end and neo-colonialism starts, is 
becoming more and more ambiguous. 
 
Another distinctive feature of neo-colonialism is that it is a relationship steeped in 
mutual economic and less often, political benefits, but is at the same time a remarkably 
asymmetrical liaison. As such, neo-colonialism is often conceptualised alongside 
‘dependence,’ a term borrowed from the dependencia school of thought, which was 
popularised in the 1960s by a number of third world Marxists to describe economic 
dependence of Third World countries on foreign corporations and governments. By this 
view, developed countries and multinational corporations force economic sanctions, 
partnerships, trade deals and the like intentionally to foster and enforce a culture within 
developing countries that is economically dependent on their own. This kind of 
relationship can also be described as clientelism, which is justified and enabled by the 
ruling elites of the weaker country, which serves the needs of a more powerful 
hegemon. In return, the elite receive goods and services in the form of aid, trade 
agreements, concessional loans, infrastructure and industry development and diplomatic 
favours, however in the long-term see themselves locked in a rapacious relationship 
(Charney 1987). But with the rise of large developing countries such as Brazil, Russia, 
India and China, former colonial powers are no longer seen to be at the forefront of such 
exploitation.  
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The emerging powers on the world arena are looking for resources to continue their 
growth and new markets to expand their economic influence under the guise of South-
South cooperation. This is a widespread practice in many African countries, whereby 
the exchange of natural resources for manufactured goods is starting a new colonial 
relationship, which will prevent Africa from developing its own manufacturing capacity 
and therefore lifting people out of poverty through economic advancement. Albeit 
considered still developing, these are normally much more powerful and economically 
advanced states that seek resources. While they are not necessarily ready to wage a war 
over the access to resources, they will use diplomacy of persuasion and exercise their 
power over the weaker, resource-rich state(s) in order to remain competitive, but it is 
not always a liaison that is forced on the weaker party. 
 
Neo-colonialism is typically exclusively attributed to outside forces and agents, which 
exempts the elites from any accountability for their role in the neo-colonial system of 
extraction. As such, caution is required when forming opinions on this issue, as neo-
colonialism can serve as a scapegoat ideology, which imputes the shortcomings of the 
internal socio-political systems to the machinations of an exaggerated external enemy 
and lifts the accountability from potentially deep-rooted issues of governance. This is 
not to say that those poorly performing developing governments are to take the sole 
responsibility for entering in an unequal relationship, but to bring some balance to the 
argument, where complete objectivity is difficult to achieve due to defences from both 
sides. Opponents argue that the concept is merely an attempt to continue to blame 
colonialism for Africa's problems rather than confront the major issues hampering 
independent African governments, such as corruption, inefficiency, and protectionism. 
They argue that these problems, more than any systematic process of external 
exploitation, have been responsible for the poor performance of African economies 
since independence. As such, the relationship could be seen as a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ between elites rather than an explicit form of neo-colonialism. 
 
Neo-colonialism is almost exclusively seen as an economic yoke, yet there are many 
tools in addition to economics that may be used by more powerful countries to engage 
in neo-colonial practices. Language and education are two very strong components of 
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advancing one’s influence in a country. This is evident in a number of formerly 
colonised states, where French, English, Spanish and Portuguese are spoken as official 
languages along with some of the indigenous languages of those areas that were much 
more widely used before the language of their former colonial masters took over. 
Language is usually coupled with education and the belief that the educational system 
of the hegemon is superior to a system that may have existed before (Rich and Recker 
2013). The language one studies in will influence the culture one gets exposed to and 
grows to know even though it can be a long process, which takes decades. Thus the 
legacy of the British education system, for instance, is evident in its former colonies and 
a number of students from former British colonies wish to enrol in British universities 
as it is a familiar system and culture; the indigenous languages are peppered with 
English words, the local cuisines are mixed with those of their former European 
masters, the traditional music is coupled with Western genres and government 
institutions share the procedures of its former colonial master. Such a mixing of cultures 
would have happened sooner or later due to globalisation, however, colonialism made 
the various European cultures in Africa very concentrated and strongly institutionalised 
in specific areas, depending on the colonial power.  
 
History is known to repeat itself and so a slow seeping of a more powerful culture is 
already evident in China’s presence in various African states, where schools have 
established Chinese language and culture classes, where Chinese films are being shown 
in the cinema and visiting scholars from China visit even the most remote universities 
on the continent (Brautigam 2011). Yet again, the imbalance in the relationship arises – 
Chinese universities welcome only a handful of African scholars every year and even 
fewer of them will be assigned to China’s top universities. At the same time, African 
culture remains very stereotyped and little known in China due to lack of African 
cultural exports available to the Chinese public. This creates a situation, where a culture 
is hegemonic, seen as superior and more relevant, which will create a neo-colonial 
dominance over small, diverse cultures that are unable to survive against a giant such as 
China. Yet the trickling of another culture into Africa is not rejected or resented by the 
locals as it happens gradually. In fact, Brautigam (2011) found that the African 
population welcomes the variety of culture in addition to the usual European or North 
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American influences on the continent and the African elite is developing quite a 
fondness for Chinese opera and art. In time, the locals will grow even more accepting of 
the new culture, until it becomes natural, which would then in turn facilitate the 
economic and political machine between the countries.  
 
As a result of the rapid expansion of Chinese businesses in Africa, increase in 
development aid and the country’s soft power offensive on the continent, the term neo-
colonialism is finding more and more use by scholars and journalists alike when 
describing Sino-Africa relations. The accusations of colonialism started to grow in 2013 
when Lamido Sanusi, the former governor of Nigeria’s central bank wrote in the 
Financial Times in 2012: “In much of Africa, they have set up huge mining operations. 
They have also built infrastructure. But, with exceptions, they have done so using 
equipment and labour imported from home, without transferring skills to local 
communities. So China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This 
was also the essence of colonialism.” As the theory of neo-colonialism explains, the 
exploiting power controls weaker states' economic resources and political systems and 
exploits their wealth under the name of economic advancement and development.  
 
Wang & Zou (2014) deny that such characteristics are applicable to Chinese relations 
with Africa. They follow the official Chinese stance according to which China is just 
another developing country with the means to help other developing countries. They 
praise China for advancing African economies and providing a fair market for their 
resources while also starting a number of social initiatives to improve the lives of the 
poor. Observing from a Chinese point of view, they see China’s diplomacy in Africa as 
all encompassing rather than one-dimensional and view China’s ‘new frontier’ 
diplomacy in Africa as a success for both China and the African states. Zhong (2011) 
rejects the idea of ‘Chinese neo-colonialism’ altogether as she sees it as a Eurocentric 
and Western dominated idea, which sprouted from a fear of losing influence in former 
colonies. In her view, China has given African states a new market to export their 
natural resources to and African consumers’ choice has been widened by the availability 
of affordable Chinese products. Rich & Recker (2013), who have a more Western point 
of view, similarly suggest that the Sino-African relationship should be seen as mutually 
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constructed and not solely focus on what China receives from African nations. They 
recognise Africa’s agency in the relationship and warrant observers to consider both 
parties, yet they concur that economics clearly motivates these growing relations and 
Chinese aid and business is welcomed by most African leaders due to China’s lack of 
conditionalities, which Western states normally apply and which have long been seen 
by African leaders as meddling in their internal affairs. In spite of the increase in aid 
and expansion of businesses, it remains an asymmetrical liaison, where China ‘buys’ 
rights to do business and extract natural resources from the African soil while gaining 
diplomatic support in international forums. 
 
Owing to the lack of theoretical coherence and consensus, five main characteristics of 
neo-colonialism have been outlined to cover the scope of this thesis. First of all, there is 
no assumption of a former colonial relationship between the parties, which allows the 
theory of neo-colonialism to be applied in the case of China in Africa. Secondly, a neo-
colonial power is not necessarily a state, but can be a multinational corporation or an 
international organisation. In addition to that, for a relationship to be classed as neo-
colonial, there has to be a distinct asymmetry in the power that one party holds over the 
other. Nevertheless, the liaison is not without some agency and agreement from the 
weaker side, and finally, neo-colonialism is not solely an economic practice, but also 
includes facets of culture, diplomacy and soft power.  
 
3.2.3. How does China see its relations with African countries? 
 
China has been pursuing a cooperation strategy with several African countries since the 
Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was launched in October 2000. FOCAC 
– a vehicle for promoting Sino-Africa relations – has become a mechanism for the 
dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and the African continent (Zafar 
2007). In 2006, China unveiled its official Africa policy, which serves as a guide to its 
relations with Africa and is based on five principles: respect for territorial integrity, 
non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit in relations, and peaceful coexistence (Sun 2014). At the 2015 FOCAC meeting 
in South Africa, China revealed its second Africa policy paper, which reiterated much 
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of what was said in the 2006 paper. When introducing the policy, Chinese premier Xi 
Jinping said: “After 30 years of reform and opening up, China is now in the position to 
help Africa realize sustainable self-development with technology, equipment, skilful 
professionals and capital” (Xinhua 2015). He also ushered in a ‘new era of win-win 
cooperation and common development, continuing on the five principles the original 
policy was based on. 
 
However, it does not always seem as a friendly exchange of services. China is the clear 
leader in the relationship and chooses to utilise its influence over smaller African states 
whenever help or support is needed. For instance, China is able to seek voting power 
from African countries in international institutions in return for development 
cooperation. In the United Nations (UN) China was able to take a permanent seat in the 
Security Council from Taiwan in 1971 as a result of African support. China mobilised 
its African voting bloc again in order to win the 2008 Olympic bid and to block the 
resolutions of the UN High Commission for Refugees, which condemned human rights 
abuses in China, and to block accusations of dumping from the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Park (2015) draws historical parallels with China’s current Africa 
policy and Sūn Zi’s philosophy Yǐ Yí Zhì Yí (use foreigners to subdue foreigners) – one 
of the significant historical ideologies meaning when the enemy or rival country was so 
powerful that huge losses could not be avoided, it utilised its neighbouring countries or 
tribes. He also brings an example of Confucius’ teaching Fù Guó Lì Míng, by which 
rulers should make a country rich first, which will then benefit people, as has been the 
process in the PRC. These age-old views support the contemporary argument that 
China’s approach to cooperation is more focused on economic results rather than 
achieving good governance and transparency.  
 
Yet, some Chinese commentators (Zhong 2011) reject accusations of China’s increased 
involvement in Africa as neo-colonialism and instead see it as ‘a broader participation 
in globalisation.’ They see Western countries as the main vehicles for any form of 
colonialism due to their capitalist system while China aims at ‘shared harmonious 
development and the harmonious structuring of the world.’ Chinese national news 
agency Xinhua often reports of Chinese officials’ visits to various African countries, 
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who always emphasise win-win cooperation and express hope that African development 
will get a new wind now that China is strongly investing in the continent. Zhang Jun, 
the economic director general at the Foreign Ministry of China, has emphasised closer 
ties with developing nations, especially with African states. He also stated that at the 
G20 meeting taking place in September 2016 in Hangzhou, African countries will have 
a bigger say and a more prominent position (Xinhua 2015). 
 
There is no doubt Africa has become a more prominent issue for China in the past 
decade, but Africa’s strategic importance for Beijing remains low compared with the 
Middle Kingdom’s worries over its relations with the USA and its neighbours, for 
instance. China’s current Africa policy is focused on win-win cooperation, but pays 
little attention to economic considerations and makes no detailed plans or predictions 
for the future of this relationship. As for now, China aims to maintain an image of a 
cooperation based on ideological rather than economical considerations.  
 
3.2.4. How does the West see China’s involvement in Africa? 
 
Hillary Clinton as the US secretary of state in her 2012 speech in Senegal warned Africa 
about China: “The continent needs a model of sustainable partnership that adds value, 
rather than extracts it” (French 2014). David Cameron echoed these negative emotions 
when he said he was increasingly alarmed by Beijing’s leading role in the new 
‘scramble for Africa’ and warned African states about China’s authoritarian capitalism, 
claiming that it is unsustainable in the long term (Hirono and Suzuki 2014). The 
European Parliament in its report on China’s Africa policy argues that China’s interest 
in Africa seems confined to resource-rich or ‘resource-cursed’ countries, bypassing a 
large number of other African countries (Gomes 2008). The Economist (2008) 
supported this sentiment: “China is building a lot of infrastructure – presumably to help 
it procure all the natural resources its firms are gobbling up.”  
 
These views are closely linked to Western national interests, which are concerned about 
the Chinese power becoming a threat to Western interests in Africa and other 
developing countries. Willis (2014) acknowledges that Chinese involvement in Africa is 
not without its problems, but at the same time it does not merit accusations of neo-
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colonialism greater than that of the more established Western actors. Corkin (2011) 
similarly sees it as a ‘marriage of convenience’ between elites rather than an explicit 
form of neo-colonial exploitation. Brautigam (2009) on the other hand, dispels the 
belief by most Western commentators that a grand strategy to colonise Africa 
masterminded by Beijing exists.  
 
China is very active in resource-rich countries and their interest in these resources is 
very real, but the notion that aid is offered mainly as quid pro quo exchange for 
resources ignores several facts. In fact China gives aid to every single country in Sub-
Saharan Africa that follows the One China policy, even the relatively wealthy South 
Africa, Botswana and Mauritius are recipients of Chinese aid. Eximbank’s concessional 
loans are given to more credit-worthy countries, who are actually capable of paying 
them back and have the ability to propose a project they will manage. If not, loans can 
be given for projects that can earn money to repay the loan, for example a Kenyan 
cement telephone pole factory and a mobile telephone network in Eritrea both received 
Chinese funding.  
 
Hirono and Suzuki (2014) and Zhong (2011) also adhere to a more benevolent view of 
China in Africa and point out that the Eurocentrism in the study of international 
relations means that the rise of non-Western powers is under-theorised in the Western 
academia, resulting in an impoverished vision of the current world order, hence the 
overuse of the term neo-colonialism. Mrs Clinton and Mr Cameron may have fallen for 
the ‘Yellow Peril’ thesis, whereby the rise of an Asian power is seen as a unique and 
unknown development that would threaten the moral fabric and international order that 
has been constructed and historically dominated by the West. Hirono and Suzuki (2014) 
also believe that Western concerns over China reflect deeply rooted anxieties that their 
traditional dominance in Africa is about to be overthrown by a non-Western power.  
 
Mawdsley (2008) studied how Western media depicts the relationship between Africa 
and China and found that the Western media is often rather poorly informed, with a 
tendency to generalise across the African continent and relies on tropes of timelessness, 
savagery, sexuality, tribal identity, conflict, and environmental disasters as apolitical 
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‘acts of god’. She makes a salient point of giving some more thought to how the West 
understands itself in Africa. There are profound differences between Western countries 
and their actions in Africa, but there is an on-going popularity of certain images 
centered on heroic white subjects from adventurers, soldiers, explorers and missionaries 
to the more contemporary, but still heroic, doctors, aid workers and journalists. The 
West has imagined itself as attempting to bring progress, science, technology and 
rationality to Africa, first through Christianity, then through commerce and now 
through good governance and development. She is critical of the recent language of 
partnership and reform, which glosses over the realities of an on-going post-colonial 
hegemony of knowledge, norms and institutions. Mercer, Mohan and Power (2003) also 
argue that Western political imaginaries of itself in relation to Africa remain dominated 
by an enduring notion of trusteeship despite a long history of exploitation and the lack 
of sufficient action to address systemic inequalities and injustice.  
 
Another issue that Western observers often subscribe to is the view that Chinese finance 
is propping up rogue regimes in several African countries. Human Rights Watch argued 
in 2007 that “China’s growing foreign aid program creates new options for dictators 
who were previously dependent on those, who insisted on human rights progress.” 
China’s engagement with Zimbabwe under the oppressive regime of Robert Mugabe 
and China’s support to Omar al Bashir’s Sudan are central to this belief. Yet the 
political conditions attached to foreign aid and sanctions applied by Western powers 
have not yielded the desired outcomes, either. Before and after China got involved, 
European banks and the US Exim Bank gave loans to Angola; Chevron and Shell 
financed oil in Nigeria and Exxon Mobil in Equatorial Guinea; Rio Tinto is still a 
significant source of investment and revenues in Zimbabwe, thus finance from China 
differs little from the other options available to most African dictators. These companies 
and countries were not champions of human rights, before public advocacy claims hit 
them. As such, Beijing fits in with these other amoral financiers quite comfortably. 
Brautigam (2009) quotes Jeffery Sachs, a Columbia University economist saying: “The 
idea that aid should be heavily conditioned with political conditions was a mistake. The 
best way to end conflict is to end poverty.”  
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3.2.5. How does Africa perceive China’s involvement on the continent? 
 
Opinions regarding Chinese involvement in Africa are divided on the continent: on the 
one hand, there are strong proponents of Chinese aid without its conditionalities and 
cooperation to better both economies, but on the other hand, some leaders are starting to 
demand higher returns for their part in the deal. Meles Zenawi, once the prime minister 
of Ethiopia makes a relevant point and assigns a large degree of agency to African 
leaders: “Good governance can only come from inside; it cannot be imposed from the 
outside.” Likewise, Serge Mombuli, ambassador from Congo-Brazzaville to the USA 
said that: “We [Africa] need both tangible and intangible things: better governance, 
democracy, transparency, but at the end of the day the population does not have 
anything to eat, does not have water to drink, no electricity at night, industry to provide 
work, so we need both. People do not eat democracy” (Brautigam 2009). President 
Kagame of Rwanda also commented in support of China that: “The Chinese bring what 
Africa needs: investment and money for government and companies. I would prefer the 
Western world to invest in Africa rather that hand out development aid” (Zhao 2014). 
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe has similarly praised China for developing its economy 
without plundering other countries. He regards the Chinese economic miracle as a 
source of pride and inspiration, but not everyone sees the relationship as mutually 
beneficial. Africans are increasingly suspicious of Chinese firms, worrying about their 
unfair deals and environmental damage.  
 
Opposition is fuelled by Africa’s thriving civil society, who demand more transparency 
and accounting for human rights from both, their own governments and foreign 
investors in the countries. In Senegal, a residents’ organisation blocked a deal that 
would have handed a prime section of property in the centre of Dakar to Chinese 
developers and in Tanzania, labour unions criticised the government for letting in 
Chinese petty traders (The Economist 2015). Scepticism about China and the fear of the 
unknown giant is shared by many ordinary Africans, but rarely receives criticism from 
government officials. When the then Zambian presidential candidate Michael Sata made 
an anti-Chinese message the centrepiece of his campaign, following an explosion in a 
Chinese mine that killed 51 Zambians, the Chinese ambassador threatened to sever 
	 31	
relations with Zambia, thus once again demonstrating China’s overarching influence 
(Gill and Reilly 2007).  
 
Thus determining the true sentiments of African leaders towards China is complex as 
those in positions of power are able to rake up a lot of the Chinese investment and put it 
in their pockets, which gives them more reason to praise their country’s friendship with 
China. Yet the majority of Africans’ hands don’t reach as far as that and they are left in 
poverty and without democratic choices, while their leaders sing the praises of their 
mutually beneficial cooperation partner.  
 
3.3. Theoretical relevance and limitations 
As stated above, neo-colonialism as a separate field of study is under theorised and 
therefore no distinguished schools of thought have emerged on neo-colonialism in 
contemporary international relations studies. The term is often used when describing 
China’s relationship with Africa in both academic and mainstream literature and media, 
but it is rarely defined and conceptualised, which can make it unclear and misleading. 
Its current conceptualisation has made the term neo-colonialism synonymous with 
‘China,’ who is considered the perpetrator by default, which can be proven with much 
empirical, but little theoretical backing. 
 
For the scope of this thesis, however, five features, which take into consideration its 
historical as well as contemporary characterisations, are used to conceptualise neo-
colonialism. Most importantly, an existing or historical colonial relationship is not 
considered a characteristic of neo-colonialism in the context of this thesis, which will 
allow China to be analysed within the theoretical framework previously provided. In 
addition to that, the geopolitical, economical and diplomatic intentions of the alleged 
neo-coloniser, born out of resource scarcity in their own country and a lack of power on 
the international arena, are considered. As the concept neo-colonialism is under 
theorised, the conceptualisation of the term in this thesis is considered sufficient to 
cover the scope of this thesis, but a more detailed framework will be required for any 
further works.  
	 32	
4. China’s foreign policy in Africa 
4.1. A historical perspective on Sino-Africa relations 
 
The founding of the PRC and the independence of African countries ushered in a new 
era in China-Africa relations. The two have since then sympathised with and supported 
each other in the struggle for national liberation and paved way for South-South 
cooperation. There is a sense of historical mutuality around the shared experience of 
colonialism that is used to defend China’s current involvements in Africa against 
accusations of imperialism. In this discourse, China wants to be clearly situated to be 
seen as a part of the ‘developing’ and not the ‘developed’ world. There is a view 
popular both in China and in any parts of Africa that the West’s historical experiences 
in achieving development are distant and dissimilar to African experiences and offer 
few transferable lessons for the continent (Zhao 2015).  
 
China’s engagement with Africa is generally divided into three phases over the past six 
decades. The first phase started with the creation of the PRC as an ideological quest 
promoting national liberation and world revolution – ‘politics takes command’ (Wang 
and Zou 2014) and lasted until the late 1970s. The aim in this period was to give each-
other political and diplomatic support with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism at the 
core. At the time, China was jostling for influence on the continent with the USSR in 
order to garner support in international forums and spread its ideology. Since China 
adopted its reform and openness strategy in the 1980s, however, this stance has been 
largely replaced by ‘economics takes command.’ Here, China became less concerned 
about ideological considerations and turned to the industrialised and developed West for 
its capital and development experience and stopped prioritising relations with African 
states. However, when the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 brought the world’s 
attention to China’s poor human rights record and Western powers distanced themselves 
from China, Beijing turned to Africa again. China was now looking for external support 
for internal development, new markets and opportunities to build trade relations. Sino-
African trade increased 431% and China increased its foreign aid to Africa during this 
new transition period (French 2014).  
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Despite pursuing economic gains and friends in international forums, there still remains 
a discourse of mutual interdependence, which fits with China’s foreign policy discourse 
of peaceful ascendance. Sun (2014) identifies four spheres of national interests that 
China has historically seeked and still pursues to satisfy in its relations with Africa. 
Politically, China seeks Africa’s support for its ‘one China’ policy and for its foreign 
policy agendas in multilateral forums such as the UN. Economically, Africa is seen 
primarily as a source of natural resources and market opportunities to fuel China’s 
domestic growth. From a security standpoint, however, the safety of growing Chinese 
investments and personnel is increasingly challenged as their presence increases. 
Ideologically, China sees the ‘China model’ in non-democratic African countries 
offering indirect support for China’s own political ideology and offers evidence that 
Western democratic ideals are not universal. China is promoting its efforts with 
extravagant rhetoric invoking the memory of colonial aggression and their common 
history with Africans as the subjects of outside oppression (Zhao 2014, Willis 2014). 
Indeed, China has no remarkable history of enslavement, colonisation or financing 
coups against unfriendly African regimes or deploying military forces in support of its 
foreign policies, but many see their recent involvement in Africa just as damaging as the 
Western powers had been in the past – a stance, which China strongly disagrees with.  
 
4.2. Policy instruments 
 
Africa is a low-priority area for China’s foreign policy as a whole and belongs to the 
category of developing countries. Africa is generally excluded from the ‘strategically 
important’ category and does not reach the highest level of decision-making and 
China’s Africa policy is mostly made, coordinated and managed at the government 
ministerial level (Sun 2014). However, for Africa, the importance of China is vast and 
cannot be overlooked. There are a number of ways China engages with Africa and the 
five most prevalent are analysed below. 
 
The complexity of disassociating Chinese aid, investment and humanitarian activities 
and the lack of transparency in China’s overseas aid and investment allocation makes it 
difficult to view these activities outside of China’s political agenda and separate them 
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from the government. The Chinese justify this secrecy to avoid criticism and 
competition from major countries also competing for African resources and markets, 
and domestic criticism for providing aid to foreign countries instead of eradicating 
poverty domestically. All forms of cooperation and investment can be viewed as 
instruments to carry out China’s foreign policy in Africa. Most of the policy instruments 
described below are underpinned by the notion of non-interference, mutual trust and 
openness, as stated in China’s Africa policy in 2006 and again in 2015. It is necessary to 
emphasise that this is the official Chinese stance and they have not claimed to only be 
an aiding hand in Africa – it is a win-win relationship as they see it. 
 
4.2.1. Development cooperation 
 
China has a stance that the antidote to conflict and instability is sustained economic 
development. China’s 2006 white paper on Africa policy outlined a new strategic 
partnership, which pledged to respect African countries’ independent choice on the road 
to development (FOCAC 2006). But before delving into discussion on China’s 
development cooperation in Africa, it is important to understand the meaning of the 
term in this context. China prefers using the term development cooperation instead of 
foreign or development aid, which is a contrast to the Western-dominated hierarchal 
development paradigm of the donor-recipient relationship. The scope of Chinese 
development cooperation includes grants, loans, debt cancellation, scholarships and 
technical training programmes, infrastructure construction, provision of volunteers such 
as doctors, nurses, teachers and other skilled professionals (Caceres and Ear 2012). 
 
Several Chinese participants, such as government, SOEs, POEs, private entrepreneurs, 
civil societies, scholars and volunteers, conduct these activities. Sometimes, a project or 
business in Africa is operated by a single player, but usually, much of the development 
cooperation is run by an unclear combination of different actors. China portrays itself 
differently from Western countries, and stresses a win-win partnership and similarities 
with the developing countries, although foreign aid is also seen as a way of paving the 
road to the African markets for the Chinese low-skilled and labour-intensive products. 
This is a strategy they adopted at home, and this is the theme of China’s current 
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strategic engagement in Africa. According to China’s policy, Africans should accept 
that aid can be offered in a frank exchange, as part of a relationship of mutual benefit, 
which makes aid less a one-way offering of alms and more a practical investment in a 
mutually profitable future.  
 
China does not report its aid numbers and as a result there is no official data series or 
point of comparison to other donors. The Chinese view is that disclosure would put 
them in a delicate position vis-a-vis aid recipients, who may feel they are not receiving 
enough assistance (Samy 2010). China likes to portray itself as a still developing 
country, so not disclosing the aid figures could also be a way if quelling any resentment 
the local Chinese population may have against the government helping foreigners. 
Nevertheless, some scholars claim that in terms of geopolitical interests China’s 
development cooperation in Africa is no different from those of other powerful 
countries. The tendency to demonise and over-determine China’s role by Western 
critics perhaps reveals more about their fears and concerns about competition from 
China than it does about the shape of contemporary China-Africa relations.  
 
From the perspective of resource rich countries, China’s ‘trade as aid’ is very attractive 
as it comes with no strings attached, whereas development aid from the West has 
conditionalities. Hence Chinese aid to countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe, known for 
their oppressive governance, tends to make headlines, but it is less reported that China 
also provides aid to counties such as Mauritius and Botswana, which are well-governed, 
democratic countries (Samy 2010). There is a popular myth surrounding Chinese aid 
and its use for securing oil concessions and mining rights. Proponents of this myth have 
linked the building of hospitals, airports, football stadiums, parliaments buildings and 
roads to China’s gaining access to raw materials found in Africa. A 2013 Rand 
Corporation study argues that China expects an expanded supply of resource 
commodities as payback for its aid (Wolf 2013), yet Drehrer et al (2015), who actually 
tracked Chinese aid commitments, reported that natural resource acquisition did not 
explain the pattern. In addition to that, Brautigam (2015) and her team of researchers 
did not uncover a single case where Chinese aid was directly swapped for a mining or 
oil concession. Only one well-known deal comes close to resembling this practice: in 
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2007, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and two Chinese 
construction companies founded a joint venture to bring a declining copper mine back 
to life. They negotiated with China’s Exim Bank to secure a $6 billion commercial rate 
loan, guaranteeing repayment out of the future profits from the mine. The loan, which 
was later reduced to $3 billion, would be used to finance infrastructure built by the two 
Chinese companies. Even in this case, however, it was clear that the primary interest of 
the Chinese companies was not access to mineral riches, but to find a way to finance the 
infrastructure projects they wanted to build in a country with a poor credit history and 
reap revenue from the project. In many other cases where Chinese banks have 
demanded a secure flow of income to guarantee large loans in Africa, there were no 
Chinese-operated mines or oil wells involved. For example, Ghana secured a $562 
million loan to build its Bui Dam from China’s Exim Bank with the backing of 
cocoa produced by Ghanaian farmers. 
 
Some observers (Moyo 2012, Brautigam 2009) assert that development cooperation in 
Africa has contributed to the general development of the continent, such as its economic 
standing and improved quality of life. Others, however, dispute its influence on Africa 
and are suspicious of the real motives of such cooperation, noting its exploitation of 
natural resources and increasing market encroachment (French 2014, Mohan and Power 
2008). China’s growth-oriented and market-based development cooperation has led 
some observers to characterise it as ‘market extremism’ and even neo-liberalism, 
though one with Chinese characteristics in recognition of Maoism and the continuing 
importance of the state (Power and Mohan 2010). Dreher et al (2015), however, contest 
the current prevailing narrative of China’s ‘rogue aid’ to resource rich countries. 
Instead, they find that Chinese overseas development assistance (ODA) to Africa is 
strongly oriented toward poorer countries and Beijing does consider humanitarian and 
socioeconomic needs when making ODA allocation decisions. But they also found 
evidence that China rewards support to its foreign policy with aid. These findings 
suggest that Chinese ODA is allocated similarly to that of Western donors. By contrast, 
more commercially-oriented forms of Chinese state financing with higher interest rates 
and lower grant elements tend to go to countries rich in natural resources and with 
higher levels of corruption. This leads analysts and policymakers to believe that Chinese 
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aid still flows to rogue states that are resource-rich. However, it is not Chinese ODA 
that disproportionately flows to such countries, but other forms of state financing and 
not ‘aid’ in the traditional sense. For instance, the Rand Corporation study in 2013 tried 
to estimate Chinese aid by aggregating media reports and the figure the study’s authors 
reached was $189.3 billion for 2011 alone. This study counted all commitments and 
signings of memorandums of understandings, but only a small number of such 
agreements come to bear fruit in reality, so the number they reached is a huge 
overstatement and a result of a flawed methodology. Including commitments as an 
estimate of Chinese official aid would be false and create a misleading understanding of 
the real extent of Chinese finance in Africa (Brautigam 2015). Besides, one would be 
hard-pressed to identify long-term economic success from the decades of Western aid to 
Africa. For instance, from 1970 to 1998, the peak era for aid to Africa, poverty rose 
from 11% to 66% (Rich and Recker 2013), which is a strong sentiment to the lack of 
effectiveness of the ‘Washington consensus.’  
 
Another popular, yet misleading claim is that China now provides as much, or more, aid 
to Africa than the United States. China committed approximately $31.5 billion of ODA 
to Africa between 2000 and 2013, or approximately $2.25 billion per year, according to 
AidData. By comparison, the United States committed nearly three times as much ODA 
to Africa over the same period of time: $92.7 billion from 2000 to 2013, or 
approximately $6.62 billion per year. When ‘other official financing,’ is included, 
Dreher et al (2015) found that China and the United States provide comparable levels of 
funding to Africa. They estimate that China and the United States committed $94.3 
billion and $107.9 billion total official financing, respectively, to Africa between 2000 
and 2013. 
 
A review of Chinese reported assistance conducted by AidData in 2014 found that 
official Chinese aid (comparable to OECD aid) disproportionately goes to the region 
where that country’s political leader was born, showing potential corruption. This has 
led observers to conclude that Chinese aid is more likely to be deployed to the leader’s 
political advantage than is US or European aid, which have more checks and balances in 
place. Despite such concerns, Chinese aid is preferable by African leaders as it offers 
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them an alternative model of development based on trade instead of foreign aid and 
subsidised loans (Moyo 2009).  
 
4.2.2. Market and resource seeking 
 
China’s economic ascendance over the past decades has led it to seek alternative 
sources of energy and resources. Africa was integrated into China’s energy strategy as 
early as 1990 (Wang and Zou 2014) and began to import oil from Africa in 1992. China 
has invested $170 million in copper mines in Zambia, it has also invested in cobalt and 
copper mines in the DRC, titanium mines in Kenya and so on. But it was in 1999 that 
China devised a ‘going out’ (zǒu chūqù) policy, which encourages Chinese firms to 
directly invest overseas, that Chinese firms started to consider foreign investment in 
Africa’s resource rich areas on a larger scale. This policy was officially adopted only in 
2004 and as a result concentrated half of the Chinese overseas investments in Africa and 
Australasia (Humphreys 2011). This policy came in handy when the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) responded to the threat of energy vulnerability with a strategy 
founded on geopolitical considerations: first, enhance domestic energy supply by new 
exploration and production in its own territories; second, secure foreign energy supply 
through bilateral and multilateral distribution and transportation arrangements; third, 
diversify sources of energy supply from as many countries of the world as possible. 
Since the new policy was revealed, Chinese companies, which are supported by the 
government and its coordinated foreign policy, have acquired and opened hundreds of 
mines, farms and factories in Africa. Consequently, the trade between China and Africa 
hit a record high of $200 billion in 2014, with a 44% increase in Chinese investment 
into the world’s poorest continent.  
 
In addition to increase in trade, this has also led to criticism of China’s engagement with 
Africa and warranted accusations of resource grabbing by Western governments as well 
as multinational companies, which have long been established in China. But, a 
Brookings Institute study concluded that Chinese firms are no more likely to invest in 
natural resources than firms from other countries, despite frequent accusations that the 
country is hungry for those resources. While Chinese states have been reluctant to 
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report their payments to a handful of governments, such as Chad, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and São Tome and Principe, other companies have been just as 
reluctant (Chen, Dollar and Tang 2015). Despite allegations of plundering Africa’s 
resources, the partnership has not only boosted growth in China, but also pumped over 
$100 billion in jobs and infrastructural projects to the African continent, historically 
marred by conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment (Zafar 2007, Zhao 2014).  
 
Many African leaders share China’s view that the relationship between them is neutral 
and business-oriented to generate economic growth for both China and African 
countries. China wants to buy minerals and Africa has them for sale. While African 
resources help feed China’s boom, Africa benefits from trade and infrastructure built 
and financed by China. New roads, railways, ports and airports have filled a critical gap 
that Western donors had been too shy to fill and opened the door of many African 
countries to a future of real development (Zhao 2014). Admittedly, much of the 
infrastructure built is crucial to China’s ability to operate effectively in Africa, but they 
still provided much-needed stimulus to the local economies. African leaders welcome 
Chinese businesses to their resources in return of turn-key projects, building of 
infrastructure and reviving industries, which have been left to deteriorate in the 
transition period after colonialism.  
 
But China’s interest in Africa is not purely based on natural resources; China also needs 
Africa for its unexplored markets for its surplus goods and capital and according to 
some observers has been the continent’s biggest trading partner since 2009. Now, 
almost no African country is without its Chinese trade component, and almost every 
African country hosts Chinese diplomats, labourers, and entrepreneurs. This has sparked 
blames of neo-colonialism and greed on China’s part: international and local media 
outlets often colour Chinese in Africa with very dark tones and question China’s 
motives for investing in Africa. Zhang et al (2013) conducted a study in which they 
found that the Chinese private enterprises’ entry to the African market is mainly 
motivated by market seeking and not by resource seeking. The fierce domestic 
competition forces a number of Chinese companies seek alternative markets and the 
desire to enter African markets is huge: Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
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approved 2,398 Chinese firms for establishment in Africa from 1988 to 2012. Only 
1,120 of these were SOEs, which engage more in mining and quarrying and less in 
agriculture and manufacturing.  With a projected population increase, the loss of vital 
agricultural land to industry and increasing consumption, Beijing sees a need to obtain 
stable sources of key foodstuffs. One solution for this is the investment in agriculture, 
fisheries and related production facilities in Africa. From this, another myth is born: 
China having an insatiable appetite for African land and plans to plant groups of 
Chinese peasants to form villages and grow food in Africa, which will then be shipped 
back to China.  
 
Stories in popular media claiming that China had purchased half the farmland in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and reports of the Chinese establishing villages across 
Africa circulated in the press in 2010. In 2012 the chief economist of the African 
Development Bank called China the biggest land grabber in Africa. Brautigam (2015) 
and her team examined 60 stories about Chinese agricultural investments, including the 
one in the DRC and they found evidence of fewer than 700,000 acres of land acquired 
by the Chinese as opposed to the reported 15 million acres. The largest existing Chinese 
farms were rubber, sugar, and sisal plantations; none of the farms studied were growing 
food for export to China. And while countries like Zambia now host as many as several 
dozen Chinese entrepreneurs, who grow crops and raise chickens for local markets, no 
villages of Chinese peasants have thus far been found in Africa. 
 
4.2.3. Foreign direct investment 
 
China’s Exim Bank, which is the main source of financial outflow to other countries, 
committed $4 billion to Africa in 2005, $5 billion in 2006 and $6 billion in 2007, almost 
equal to that of the World Bank (Park 2015). These numbers keep growing year-by-year 
as China wins more business in Africa. According to MOFCOM the value of new 
contracts signed in 2013 was $171.6 billion. European Council on Foreign Relations, 
however, reported in 2012 that since the Chinese ‘going out’ policy was reintroduced in 
2010, their overseas investment has increased, but the main increase was in Europe, 
where investment increased 102% and the USA with 74% rather than emerging 
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economies. Nevertheless, China remains Africa’s biggest trading partner and plays an 
essential role in reconfiguring a number of African economies even if Africa’s 
importance for China may be small in comparison. 
 
Many of the Chinese investments and contracts are in labour-intensive sectors, not only 
in construction but also in the extraction of energy and mineral resources. SOEs are 
driving the global expansion of Chinese direct investment: in 2010, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by SOEs accounted for 61.6% of outward flows. In 2011 SOEs 
represented 80% of China’s stock market, and consequently dominate the domestic 
market as well as the sphere of international expansion (Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel 
2015). Moreover, as China further liberalises, private Chinese businesses prop up and 
become less and less easy to control in China itself, let alone in Africa. This is a major 
conundrum for the Chinese government wishing to safeguard Beijing’s image abroad as 
a ‘responsible power.’ Contrary to popular belief, the Chinese companies abroad have 
considerable freedom to operate and thanks to favourable trade terms struck between 
China and various African states, will be able to reap even higher revenues.  
 
Another criticism towards China and its business practices is their lack of reporting and 
secretive deals. However, Chinese companies have proven to be no more or less 
forthcoming than others about their investments, despite accusations that Chinese firms 
have a transparency problem. They filed reports about payments to governments of the 
countries they are investing in at roughly the same rate as companies based in other 
investing nations, according to the Extractive Industries Transparency Institute (EITI), 
which collects those reports and distributes the information, thereby implementing the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a global reporting standard for natural 
resource investment transparency and accountability. According to EITI, in countries 
that are implementing the initiative, Chinese companies disclose information on 
payments to governments to the same extent as companies from other countries. That 
was found true even in highly sensitive areas like mineral mining and oil production. In 
other words, Chinese companies are largely abiding by global reporting standards 
(Matfess 2015). Chinese compliance with EITI requirements is all the more impressive 
when one considers that China is not an EITI implementing country and has not shown 
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any interest in adopting the EITI’s reporting provisions within its own borders. Yet 
despite this seemingly transparent reporting system, there are a number of Chinese 
companies that make deals directly with the government or corrupt officials. The 
investment and proceeds from these deals are rarely reported and normally get away 
without paying tax.  
 
China-Africa trade is not a one-way flow of goods and commodities. In order to 
promote Africa’s market and economic development, China removed import tariffs 
from 45 categories of products from Africa. Consequently, in 2007 African products 
worth approximately $450 million were imported to China without any duty (Park 
2015). In return, many African countries have lifted import tax from Chinese products - 
a move, which has not had favourable consequences. While the availability of Chinese 
products enhances Africa’s consumption levels, African industries have been undercut 
concurrently due to competition from imported Chinese goods. Labour-intensive 
industries such as textiles, clothing, footwear and furniture are the hardest hit: for 
instance, more than 40% of footwear and knitted fabrics purchased in South Africa 
come from China (Zhao 2014). While the majority of Chinese imports may originate 
from resource-rich countries, Chinese business interests are far more geographically 
diverse, with over 800 Chinese companies conducting business in 49 African countries. 
Additionally, many of these exports include commodities that are the main driver of the 
economy in the exporting countries. For instance up to 20% of China’s demand for 
cotton is met by trade with Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. Côte d’Ivoire supplies the 
vast majority of China’s cocoa; Namibia is one of China’s main suppliers of fish and 
Kenya remains one of the key suppliers of Chinese coffee (Tiffen 2014).  
 
As China’s involvement in Africa deepens and Western policymakers worry about 
whether they can compete with a flood of Chinese cash and look at many failed projects 
as evidence of the mixed success of China’s ‘scramble for Africa.’ It is true that new 
railways and roads funded by China’s Exim Bank, and its investment in copper mines 
and oilrigs in places such as Zambia and Angola, are changing the face of the continent, 
but there is growing evidence that some Chinese firms that leap into Africa are 
struggling with the same problems Africa has long given Western investors. A common 
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problem is that Chinese firms assume that business works the way it does in China.  In 
China, a company comes in, makes an arrangement with local government, and the 
government delivers. In Africa, they discover that government promises to build 
infrastructure, provide power or supply land are not as credible as they thought. Public 
land turns out to be occupied by squatters, who may have farmed it for generations; 
private land may not be owned by the people selling it. Local politicians do not accept 
deals struck by national ones and demand bribes. Chinese firms are now having to do 
what Western firms have long done: invest in corporate social responsibility 
programmes, hire African managers and do thorough due diligence.  
 
There is a huge amount of red tape and bureaucracy, which all facilitate corruption; 
there is a lack of infrastructure and basic government services such as power, 
connectivity and fresh water supply. For instance, a Chinese firm invested over $1 
billion in a 3 million-hectare palm oil plantation in the DRC. When work started, the 
Chinese found that there were no roads, the river was barely navigable and the villagers 
were hostile. The Chinese company went ahead nonetheless and planted a small amount 
of land – the crop was immediately stolen and the project soon disappeared (Sautman 
and Hairong 2009).  
 
Never before has geopolitical risk and conflict overseas so impacted Chinese economic 
and security interests. The fate and well being of millions of Chinese individuals abroad 
has become a part of the Chinese national interest. Many Chinese companies were 
caught up in the turmoil of political changes in North Africa during the Arab Spring. 
More than $4 billion worth of projects were halted in Libya and more than 35,000 
Chinese workers were evacuated after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011. The Chinese 
government also had to deal with the kidnapping of 29 Chinese workers in Southern 
Sudan in 2012 and deal with murdered Chinese managers in Zambia and a number of 
thefts (Zhao 2014).  
 
The official number of Chinese workers in Africa at the end of 2012 was 200,00 
compared to the more commonly repeated estimate of 2 million, which could be an 
underestimate (Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel 2015). Howard French (2014) in his book 
	 44	
“China’s Second Continent” interviewed a number of Chinese workers, who decided to 
stay in Africa beyond their project end date. He found that labourers staying on at the 
end of their contracts constitute the biggest single source of migration to Africa. Several 
African government and NGO officials argued that the Chinese government actively 
supports emigration by requesting loose immigration rules for Chinese nationals. As a 
consequence, Chinese firms have been accused of making predatory profits at the 
expense of local employment and growth.  
 
In several countries there have been reports of hostility against the Chinese 
communities, who often live in closed compounds. The reality on the ground is more 
complex. At one extreme is a Chinese construction firm, which brought 12,000 Chinese 
workers to fulfil a contract in 2007 for the construction of 20,000 housing units in 
Angola. On the other extreme are construction projects carried out by companies, who 
have adopted a localisation policy and work with a minimal number of Chinese staff, 
who are mostly engineers and managers. The head of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway 
project, for instance, won in August 2013 by China Road and Bridge Corporation, told 
the press that 2000 Chinese employees and 30,000 Kenyans would carry out the work. 
At the same time, the IMF, World Bank, the EU and other Western funders deposit their 
aid, loans and grants straight into a government account, from where it might simply 
disappear. Government revenues from oil and natural resources exported to the West are 
exposed to the same risks. But as a result of this increased involvement of locals, 
Chinese companies have started to avoid some of the most chaotic corners of Africa and 
Chinese investors have realised that good governance norms are necessary to protect 
their investment.  
 
4.2.4. Infrastructure projects 
 
Infrastructure projects are some of the most visible tenets of the Chinese presence in 
Africa. When travelling along highways in Africa, it is difficult to miss the many signs 
proclaiming that a road, town sewage system or a new housing development was built 
with financing from China. When going through road works in Mozambique, for 
instance, there are hundreds of African workers wearing hi-visibility vests with Chinese 
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writing on it, trying to make sense of the instructions their Chinese manager is giving 
them in a mixture of Portuguese, English and Chinese. While infrastructure projects like 
roads, schools and housing units seem to benefit the whole community, China has been 
accused of only building infrastructure in Africa in order to facilitate taking out 
resources, but portraying these projects as selfless help to Africa (Foster et al 2008).  
 
The World Bank in its 2008 report acknowledged a huge opportunity this 
unprecedented flood of infrastructure financing presents for many African countries, but 
they urged to seek tangible value for African countries in these deals. Sub-Saharan 
Africa lags behind other developing regions on most standard indicators of 
infrastructure development, prompting African leaders to call for greater international 
support in this sphere. By far the largest gaps arise in the power sector, with generation 
capacity and household access in Africa at around half the levels observed in South 
Asia and about a third of the levels observed in East Asia and the Pacific. Unreliable 
power supply leads to losses in industrial production valued at 6% of turnover. 
Furthermore, Africa’s limited infrastructure services tend to be much costlier than those 
available in other regions. For example, road freight costs in Africa are two to four 
times as high per kilometre as those in the United States, and travel times along key 
export corridors are two to three times as high as those in Asia due to poor road 
conditions (Odoom 2015).  
 
A lot of China’s activities in the infrastructure sphere have focused on the construction 
of large hydropower schemes. By the end of 2007, China was providing at least $3.3 
billion towards the construction of 10 major hydropower projects. If completed, these 
schemes would increase the total available hydropower generation capacity in Sub-
Saharan Africa by 30%. In some cases, official assistance has simultaneously been used 
to provide transport and power generation infrastructure needed to facilitate export of 
minerals such as iron in Gabon or phosphate in Mauritania. According to Foster et al 
(2008) only 10% of Chinese infrastructure finance is directly linked to natural resource 
exploitation whilst most of the resources are directed to broader development projects. 
However, these development projects may in turn be tied to access to natural resources. 
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Another criticism of Chinese infrastructure projects is that in exchange for most 
Chinese financial aid to Africa, Beijing requires that infrastructure construction and 
other contracts favour Chinese service providers. Allegedly, 70% of them go to 
‘approved’, mostly state-owned, Chinese companies, and the rest are open to local 
firms, many of which are also joint ventures with Chinese groups. While this used to be 
true, China has now relaxed these rules and is engaging local employees and the vast 
majority of employees at Chinese firms are now local hires, but managers still tend to 
be Chinese. Sautman and Hairong (2015) surveyed 400 Chinese companies operating in 
over 40 African countries and found that while management and senior technical 
positions tended to remain Chinese, more than 80% of workers were local. Some 
companies had localised as much as 99% of their workforce. Some local workers have 
even been sent to China for management training to train them in the ways of Chinese 
management styles and to give them an opportunity to learn Chinese and thus act as 
‘middle men’ between China and Africa. These practices make economic sense for 
Chinese companies: in order to bring workers from China, they would have to pay 
much higher salaries, plus pay for airfare, room, and board. There are certainly tensions 
around many Chinese worksites in Africa, but they tend to stem from disputes about 
salaries and work conditions — not whether jobs exist for locals (Brautigam 2015).  
 
4.2.5. Soft power 
 
The former Chinese premier Hu Jintao identified soft power as a policy priority in 2007 
and China has been making efforts to spread its cultural influence around the world, 
especially the global South, since then. Soft power has always been regarded as a 
relatively weak link in China’s foreign policy, by both Chinese and foreign observers. 
Despite this, the general public opinion towards China seems favourable according to 
the nine African countries included in the Pew 2015 Global Indicator (Sun 2015). 
However, this affinity seems to be evoked more by China’s economic allure and 
political friendship than cultural or ideological attractiveness. Joseph Nye, who coined 
the term ‘soft power’ reasons that China’s large investment in soft power has had a 
limited return, because China refuses to include African and its own civil society in its 
political and economical decision-making. He argues that China prefers to work with 
	 47	
governments as the source of soft power, rather than individuals, the private sector or 
civil society. In the Chinese view, the prevailing political norms and public opinion in 
African countries are heavily influenced by their former colonial masters. Sun (2015) 
points out that many, if not the most, African political and business elite receive their 
education in the West, causing them to identify more closely with Western culture, 
ideology and interests. Therefore, for Chinese culture, political values and discourse to 
prevail in Africa, China faces a significant psychological, cultural, educational and 
communications problem. In order to combat this, African civil servants are being 
trained by their hundreds in Chinese universities at the cost of the Chinese government, 
who regards education as a long-term investment to ‘win the hearts and minds of 
Africa’s future leaders’ (Kaiman 2013).  
 
The Confucius Institutes, which are largely seen as a direct application of cultural 
influence, have opened in 29 African countries and provide thousands of fellowship 
opportunities to African youth apart from lessons in Chinese language, culture and 
customs. At the FOCAC meeting in Johannesburg in December 2015, Chinese president 
Xi Jinping announced 10 major plans to boost cooperation with Africa over the 
following three years. These include establishing a number of regional vocational 
education centres and several capacity-building colleges to address Africa’s lack of 
skilled workers. These will train 200,000 technicians and provide African students with 
40,000 training opportunities in China. Xi pledged to offer African students 2000 
education opportunities with degrees or diplomas and 30,000 government scholarships 
and invite 200 African scholars to visit China each year (Bothwell 2016). China will 
also continue sending medical teams to Africa, which it has been doing since 1963, to 
train local doctors and nurses and help out in remote clinics and hospitals. But in the 
recent wave of engagement expansion with Africa, these doctors and nurses have started 
to promote Chinese pharmaceuticals, especially anti-malarials, in the continent (Provost 
and Harris 2013). While Africans may understand that China is pushing heavily into the 
African market with its pharmaceutical products, Chinese medicine is generally more 
affordable to the African public than its Western equivalents, so with the lack of 
options, they would choose the cheaper option. 
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China also places a great emphasis on symbolic diplomacy to court African leaders. 
China hosts and funds high-level summits, state banquets and a number of high-ranking 
Chinese officials regularly visit various African countries. China has built the largest 
number of embassies and consulates and each year the first overseas trip of the Chinese 
foreign minister is to Africa. These displays of friendship and respect are widely 
appreciated in Africa and stand in contrast to the more dismissive attitude often adopted 
by Western countries (Willis 2014). Chinese multinationals involved in development 
cooperation are keen to construct national symbols, such as the president’s palace, the 
national assembly, government facilities and national sports arenas, in order to increase 
the Chinese presence, visibility and influence. Most famously, China provided the funds 
to construct the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. These buildings are not 
only big sources of revenue, but also help China to consolidate its friendship with 
African countries.  
 
While Chinese soft power may go unnoticed in North America and Europe, it is very 
visible in Africa, South America and the Middle East. Most TV satellite providers in the 
developing world now include CCTV channels – the Chinese state owned Central 
Television; copies of China Daily and various Chinese-edited opinion magazines can be 
found on newspaper stands in African countries. Specific Chinese product aisles have 
appeared in African supermarkets and Africans are increasingly opening their taste buds 
to new experiences, no longer fearing Chinese food as only being snakes and bugs. 
Apart from these very visual signs, China is increasingly taking part in peacekeeping 
operations on the continent and anti-piracy efforts in the region. The country now 
provides the largest number of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations among the 
five permanent members of the UN Security Council and is the 7th top provider of 
financial contributions to these operations (Wang and Zou 2014). The UN has also 
praised China for their highly trained peacekeepers and for providing help with 
demining across several African countries. 
 
It would be foolish to disregard Chinese soft power efforts on the African continent as 
unfruitful. Soft power works slowly and takes time to seep into the society; visible signs 
and an interest in Chinese culture, beyond what China can do for Africa financially, are 
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emerging. The Sino-African ‘friendship’ may well be on its way beyond economic 
mutual gains.  
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5. China-Zimbabwe relations 
5.1. A historical perspective 
 
Seeking to emerge from the Soviet shadow and establish itself as a credible 
international player, China positioned itself as the leading patron of the global South by 
opposing Soviet-sponsored liberation movements on the continent. Mugabe’s foreign 
policy took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to gain support for his Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU) party, which later became ZANU-PF (Patriotic Front) after 
merging with Joshua Nkomo’s opposition and is ruling till today. With its patronage 
secure, Mugabe fully embraced China. He started to call himself a ‘Marxist-Leninist of 
Maoist thought,’ demonstrating his commitment to socialism and still prefers to be 
addressed as a comrade. He sent his troops to train in China and pledged to maintain 
strong ties with China once Zimbabwe had overthrown Ian Smith’s white minority 
government. Mugabe won Zimbabwe’s first multi-racial election in 1980 and 
solidifying diplomatic relations with China quickly became one of his top foreign-
policy concerns. An official state visit by Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister and the 
President himself soon followed, but only to have their enthusiasm quenched by China. 
In their 1981 meeting, Deng Xiaoping reportedly told Mugabe that he needed to move 
beyond ideological concerns and further pursue the Chinese model of capitalism. 
China’s interest in Zimbabwe cooled, and vice versa. Mugabe was accepted by Western 
leaders for his acceptance of democracy and capitalism and stopped pursuing Chinese 
friendship (Edinger and Burke 2008). 
 
The situation changed with the Tiananmen Square events of 1989. China was dismissed 
by the international community for its failure to support human rights. This is when 
China once again turned to Africa to find allies and friends. China started to emphasise 
its policy of non-interference and argued that Western views of human rights could 
threaten the African long-standing social systems and governments. Zimbabwe quickly 
adopted this rhetoric and made statements that defended China’s actions in Tiananmen 
Square. Mugabe criticised the ‘concerted efforts from Western circles to destabilise 
China’ and many African governments followed his lead. As a reward and cooling of 
relations with the West, China substantially increased its trade with Zimbabwe and the 
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other African states that had come to its defence. Since then, Mugabe has seen China as 
a better trading partner than the West. Both have similarly fought against colonialism 
and share socialist values, at least on paper. When Mugabe visited Beijing in 2014 in 
search for more investment, President Xi Jinping said: “The traditional friendship 
between China and Zimbabwe was forged in the glorious years when we stood shoulder 
to shoulder against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony," thus likening the two 
countries’ history and struggle against the Western powers (Moore 2014).  
 
Chinese high-ranking officials are often welcomed to Zimbabwe as rock stars. For 
instance, when Zhao Ziyang visited Zimbabwe in 1982, five thousand people waited at 
the airport to greet him, they stampeded on the runway and five women were trampled 
to death (Brautigam 2009). President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe for two days in early 
December 2015, which was the first by a Chinese President since the visit of Jiang 
Zemin in 1996. President Xi was received with pomp and pageantry and the streets of 
Harare were lined with posters welcoming the great friend and partner of Zimbabwe. 
Allegedly, over $1 billion has been earmarked for Zimbabwe’s energy and 
telecommunication sectors to boost its economic recovery. “We will work with 
Zimbabwe and all other friendly African nations to pave a broader and more solid road 
of mutual benefit and common development for China and Africa,” Xi said in his 
statement ahead of the visit. Mugabe reciprocated the sentiment: “Our friendship is now 
much more than mere friendship – there being economic agreements where China will 
assist Zimbabwe to develop economically” (Moyo 2016). To top it off, China awarded 
its Confucius Peace Price, the Chinese equivalent to Nobel Peace Price, to Mugabe in 
October 2015 for ‘injecting fresh energy into the global quest for harmony’ (Phillips 
2015). 
 
Yet all is not as bright and mutually beneficial as it first seems. Zimbabwe’s military 
intervention in Mozambique and then into the Democratic Republic of Congo in late 
1980s and early 1990s placed an enormous strain on Zimbabwe’s resources and proved 
immensely unpopular in the West. With the economy failing, Mugabe found himself 
under intense pressure both at home and abroad. When the issue of land redistribution, 
which his party had promised to solve, re-emerged, Mugabe implemented an extremely 
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controversial programme of compulsory land redistribution in 2000, which saw land 
forcibly taken from white farmers and given to blacks. There are widely held 
perceptions that this was a desperate effort to garner domestic support. Whatever the 
motivation, Zimbabwe has since experienced a steady regression away from democratic 
governance toward social and political upheaval and a steep economic downturn. So the 
country, once heralded as the breadbasket of Africa and boasting nearly a 100% literacy 
rate, has since 2000 experienced a crisis of governance, which has led this once 
prosperous country into a socio-economic and political decline. Critics argue that this 
crisis has been intensified by China’s assistance to the Robert Mugabe regime and 
China’s protection of the regime in the UN Security Council. It is suggested that 
Zimbabwe as a whole will not and has not benefitted from the Chinese presence and 
assistance in the country, because they do not encourage good governance. Nonetheless 
China’s non-intervention policy is attractive to Mugabe, who officially declared a ‘Look 
East’ policy in 2003. President Mugabe praised that: “China has been able to develop 
its economy without plundering other countries and the Chinese economic miracle is 
indeed a source of pride and inspiration” (Hodzi et. al. 2012). 
 
5.2. Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy 
 
After the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2003, which resulted in capital flight 
and economic depression in Zimbabwe, the country adopted a ‘Look East’ policy. "We 
have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun 
sets. That’s where the majority of the world is, that’s where we also get the greatest 
support, because the East is the Third World,” Mugabe said to a crowd celebrating the 
country’s 25th year of independence a few years after this policy was accepted 
(Meldrum 2005). Ties between Zimbabwe and the West have loosened since then, while 
China is now described as the only major international supporter of Zimbabwe. A year 
later, Mugabe explained the rhetoric behind this policy to an audience celebrating the 
National Heroes’ Day in Harare. His argument was built on the common struggle 
Zimbabwe and China have and are fighting against the ‘pretentious, free, so-called 
Christian world, and China helped Zimbabwe win their freedom and liberties’ (BBC 
2005).  
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Although the Zimbabwean government often refers to the Look East policy, it has never 
outlined what exactly this policy entails. Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states 
on its website that ‘Zimbabwe prioritises projects in which a cooperating country has 
expressed interests in projects in which Zimbabwe has a competitive advantage, 
projects that are ready for implementation and will promote exports and projects meant 
to assist in the re-capitalisation of distressed public enterprises.’ Based on this, a 
deliberate decision was made to initially focus on China, Iran, Indonesia, India and 
Malaysia in effecting this policy. The Ministry clarifies further that ‘there is an 
unwritten understanding that there are no permanent friends or enemies, but permanent 
interests. Therefore, Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy strives to foster long-standing 
relationships of mutual cooperation and trust.’ 
 
China has emerged as the clear focus of the Look East Policy and is ever more 
important for Zimbabwe, who is still under EU sanctions and despite some economic 
reforms, experiencing a downturn. Mugabe has paired this policy with his anti-white 
and anti-Western rhetoric. He said in the 2013 UN general assembly session that 
Zimbabwe was under constant threat from “covetous and bigoted big powers whose 
hunger for domination and control of other nations and their resources knows no 
bounds…Shame, shame, shame we say to the United States of America. Shame, shame, 
shame we say to Britain and its allies who have continued to impose sanctions, illegal 
sanctions upon our people.” His sharp criticism caused the US delegation to walk out 
of the general assembly session to demonstrate their disapproval of the president 
(Reuters 2013). Similarly, at the 69th session of the UN general assembly President 
Mugabe said: “Zimbabwe has been pre-occupied with the empowerment of its people 
economically…has become a victim of the evil machinations of western countries who 
continue to apply unilateral and illegal sanctions as a foreign policy tool to achieve 
short-term political objectives, particularly regime change…regime change is a 
diabolical illegal policy of interference in the domestic affairs of my country and no 
good can come from undermining our economy, or depriving our citizens of the 
necessities of life. Why, I ask, should Zimbabweans continue to suffer under the 
American and British yoke of unjustified and unwarranted illegal sanctions?” It seems 
clear that Mugabe is dissatisfied with the West and its conditions and sanctions, which 
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make China an even more attractive partner in trade, development, agriculture and 
business.  
 
5.3. Sino-Zimbabwe engagement 
 
The relationship between China and Zimbabwe has only recently started to make more 
headlines despite the fact that the two countries share quite a long history. Partly due to 
Zimbabwe’s Look East policy and partly due to Zimbabwe’s troubles with its traditional 
supporters, the engagement between China and Zimbabwe has intensified in all areas of 
cooperation. The following will look at the extent of Chinese investment and 
involvement in Zimbabwe through the five areas discussed previously in a wider pan-
African perspective. 
 
5.3.1. Development cooperation 
 
Zimbabwe is often brought as an example of a ‘victim’ of Chinese development 
cooperation, which has crippled the local economy while the elite have derived the 
benefits of the liaison. Hodzi, Hartwell and de Jager (2012) assessed the impact of 
China’s development assistance to Zimbabwe and found that the Chinese model of 
development seems to be based on the idea that projects, which are aimed at 
development, are deemed more important than concerns about good governance. This is 
illustrated by China’s own growth, where economic development helped lift several 
hundred million people out of abject poverty in the past 40 years without giving much 
attention to the issue of human rights, for instance. China’s non-interference policy in 
internal affairs and the fact that China does not insist on stringent conditions is an 
attraction to African leaders like the president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe.  
 
In the wake of the Zimbabwe crisis in late 1990s as the Mugabe regime became more 
and more isolated from Western investors and donors, it turned to China, Libya and Iran 
for assistance. By offering aid without preconditions, China has presented an attractive 
alternative to conditional Western aid, and in return gained valuable diplomatic support 
to defend its international interests. The study concluded that it has allowed for 
increased corruption amidst diminished political accountability, and undermined the 
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role of civil society in the country. They account this to the lack of conditions and good 
governance and praise the Western world for their respect for human rights. They argue 
that ultimately states have their self-interest in mind and with that China has only 
supported the oppressive Robert Mugabe regime and not promoted a developmental 
agenda. Caution must be applied in making such conclusions, as there is very little data 
available on the real amount of aid China has given to Zimbabwe, which can make such 
accusations pre-emptive.  
 
According to AidData, which relies on information available publicly, China financed 
166 development cooperation projects in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013. In 2011, 
China signed off a $700 million loan to Zimbabwe that focused on agricultural 
development, machinery, medical care and water systems. The loan was followed by 
another $150 million to upgrade to expand the Victoria Falls International Airport in 
2012, and further reinforced by a $319 million concessional loan for the expansion of 
Kariba Power Station in 2013. These projects also included sending teams of doctors to 
rural areas, building of schools, donating farming and IT equipment, food aid and even 
a TV screen installed in a mall to advertise Mugabe’s party ZANU-PF. China’s Xinhua 
news agency reported that Beijing invested more in Zimbabwe in 2013 than any other 
African country: $601 million in projects (Chen and McGroarty 2015). However, critics 
believe these investments are marginal compared to what Chinese companies have 
gained from Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth and have come at the cost of human lives and 
widespread human rights abuses. These examples show that, theoretically, both 
countries should have benefitted from this relationship, however, the on-going 
economic and governance crisis in Zimbabwe shows that perhaps the fruit of the 
cooperation with China has not had the expected benefits for everyone in Zimbabwe.  
 
Even though Chinese development cooperation is somewhat secretive and exact 
numbers and sums cannot be reported with full certainty, 166 projects in 13 years speak 
volumes. In addition to that, when Xi Jinping visited Harare in December 2015, he 
pledged even more aid to the impoverished country, in exchange of which he allegedly 
seeks uranium and copper from the resource rich landlocked country. This most recent 
pledge has panned out in a surprisingly beneficial way for Zimbabwe: China’s long-
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time rival Japan invited president Mugabe to visit soon after Xi’s visit to Harare and 
prime minister Shinzo Abe pledged development support worth $5.3 million to help 
rebuild Zimbabwe’s infrastructure (The Guardian 2016). It remains to be seen if Japan’s 
aid to African states will be painted with the same brush as China’s aid has been by the 
Western media, but it also urges even more caution when blaming other countries for 
plundering Zimbabwe. Mugabe himself praises China for extending a helpful hand 
while Western aid has dried up and it is not without the President and government’s 
agency that these transactions are able to take place.  
 
5.3.2. Market and resource seeking 
 
As China has given aid worth billions of dollars to Zimbabwe, Mugabe has extended a 
generous hand towards China many times as well. For instance, after the majority of 
white-owned farms in Zimbabwe were seized in 2000, China International Water and 
Electric, a state owned company, was contracted to farm 250,000 acres of land in 
exchange for tobacco (Hodzi et al 2012). Chinese firms also have mining rights for 
copper and gold in Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean government has turned a blind eye 
on illegal poaching for rhino horn, which is mainly exported to China.  
 
However, China’s involvement in the Marange diamond mine – the largest alluvial 
diamond field in the world – has caused the most controversy. The operations in 
Marange have come under fierce criticism globally for human rights abuses. Chinese 
companies operating there in cooperation with Zimbabwean government are blamed for 
their lack of concern for human rights and are said to be helping to preserve President 
Mugabe’s authoritarian rule. The discovery of alluvial diamond deposits in the rural 
Chiadzwa area of Marange district in Southeast Zimbabwe in 2005 brought a new 
dimension to politics in Zimbabwe and its relations with China. The mines cover an 
area of 10 square miles and are worth billions of dollars - a potential source of wealth 
for the next 80 years, which could make a vital contribution to rebuilding the country 
brought to ruin by economic mismanagement (Towriss 2013).  
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A British company, African Consolidated Resource was granted exclusive mining rights 
at first, but in 2006 the Mugabe regime declared the mines open to all comers in an 
effort to gain political capital. Thousands of unlicensed, desperate Zimbabweans 
descended on the area to pan for diamonds and police exploitation and corruption 
soared. When the miners started to smuggle diamonds out of the country through 
Mozambique, the government sent hundreds of soldiers to evict the miners by force and 
sealed the diamond field off from public access in November 2008. Human rights 
groups estimate that between 200 and 400 were shot dead, and many more were beaten, 
tear-gassed, mauled by dogs or raped (The Telegraph 2010). Anjin Investments, a 
Chinese company, and the state-owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation 
(ZMDC) jointly owned the mine until the former was evicted by the Zimbabwean 
government in early 2016, allegedly for not paying wages to the labourers after the 
alluvial diamonds became scarce. The ZMDC, however, is owned by the Zimbabwe 
National Army through its subsidiary company Zimbabwe Defense Industries and by 
another company linked to the army (Freedom House 2012). The extractive sector in 
Zimbabwe is heavily militarised - the generals have become company directors and 
shareholders on behalf of the government, which has created an atmosphere of fear and 
violence around the Marange diamond mine. A secret airstrip next to the mine was 
discovered on aerial photographs in 2010 and analysts believe the runway is intended 
for arms shipments, which are paid for in gemstones from the mine (Thornycroft and 
Berger 2010). A Chinese businessman, known as Sam Pa, allegedly used to visit 
Zimbabwe once a month on his private jet and is accused of carrying out gemstones 
using the secret airstrip. He was also accused of providing the Zimbabwean secret 
police with $100 million and a fleet of trucks, but has denied both accusations (Sharife 
2013). In a twist of plot, Sam Pa, who was seen as China’s trailblazer in Africa, was 
arrested in Beijing with accusations of corruption in relation to Sinopec. A prominent 
Zimbabwean human rights activist Farai Muguwu said in an interview given to 
Georgetown University in 2014 that “the Chinese companies are the most difficult to 
reach. They are simply not interested in dialogue with civil society, and do not agree to 
meetings. It is a politics of patronage. They come at the invitation of a politician and 
they are answerable to that politician, not even to the government.“ Similarly, many 
Zimbabweans on the ground believe the Chinese non-interventional trade and foreign 
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aid policies help along to human rights abuses in this and other mines across the 
country.  
 
5.3.3. Foreign direct investment 
 
Zimbabwe does not pose a huge market opportunity to China compared to some other 
African countries, nevertheless, Chinese products, especially pharmaceuticals and 
farming equipment, are making their way to the local shops and supermarkets. China 
became Zimbabwe’s biggest trading partner following Zimbabwe’s isolation by its 
former Western trading partners over the country’s human rights record. Headlines of 
China-Zimbabwe economic deals often grace the covers of the state-run Herald 
newspaper in Zimbabwe while the privately owned (mostly expat) Zimbabwean media 
is not so positive about the influx of Chinese FDI.  
 
While Zimbabwe is not the most stable country to invest in, it possesses huge natural 
resource reserves and a market potential for expansion, which is an attraction to Chinese 
SOEs and POEs. The number of Chinese firms has rapidly increased in Zimbabwe, 
many of them involved in mining, but also in agriculture, retail and construction. In the 
light of increased interest in the country, China is keen to protect its investments in the 
country and to keep Chinese assets from being appropriated by corrupt government 
ministers. Luckily China holds many leverages over Zimbabwe to do that: China is 
Zimbabwe’s most important economic partner and has helped train the military there for 
more than two decades, by exerting diplomatic pressure on Mugabe. Thus China is 
protecting its own interests, given the threat to their investment in the country; besides, 
Zimbabwe needs the Chinese investment (Zhao 2014). In December 2015, Zimbabwe 
announced that it has made the Renminbi legal tender after Beijing confirmed it would 
cancel $40 million in debts (AFP 2015). This has not made a significant change in the 
nation, which also uses US Dollar, South African Rand and Botswana Pula as legal 
tenders, but has given Chinese businesses an incentive to invest, save on exchange rates, 
take money out of the country more easily and make transactions more predictably.  
 
According to official Chinese statistics, Zimbabwe received the most Chinese 
investment among all African countries in 2013 (Sun 2014), but in 2015 China’s 
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Ministry of Commerce said that Chinese investment in Africa dropped 40% in the first 
six months of 2015 (Chen and McGroarty 2015). Due to economic downturn in China, 
the direct investment to Zimbabwe has decreased, yet the Chinese businesses that were 
active in Zimbabwe prior to 2015 are staying put and reaping the benefits of less 
competition. However, critics believe these investments are marginal compared to what 
Chinese companies have gained from Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth and have come at the 
cost of human lives. Theoretically, both countries should have benefitted from this 
relationship, however, the on-going economic and governance crisis in Zimbabwe 
shows that perhaps the fruit of the cooperation with China has not had the expected 
benefits for everyone in Zimbabwe.  
 
5.3.4. Infrastructure projects 
 
Zimbabwe has an estimated 85% unemployment rate, is crippled by the EU and USA 
imposed sanctions and to top it off, has been hit by drought and hunger this year. It is 
clear that Zimbabwe is seeking more than friendship from China. The concessionary 
funding received from China in 2015 will help increase the output of the Hwange power 
station, which will slightly reduce the power shortage in Zimbabwe – a problem, which 
has acquired comedy status in the once wealthy country. Moreover, China also awarded 
Zimbabwe a grant worth $62.4 million, which will be used to construct a new 
parliament building – the current building has become too small for the over 300 
legislators, up from less than 40 during the pre-independence days (Moyo 2016). It 
remains to be seen whether or not this financial help will aid the country’s economic 
recovery and how much of it will actually materialise. 
 
Chinese financed infrastructure projects in Zimbabwe have been subjects of much 
controversy. Allegedly, China is building roads to take resources in and out of the 
diamond mines, which only advance their own business interests. Indeed many mega-
deals between the two countries have already received financing. The expansion of 
Victoria Falls Airport was one of the biggest recipients of Chinese loan with $150 
million as was the rehabilitation of Harare’s municipal water supply and sewage 
treatment with $144 million along with the $319.5 million expansion of one of the 
biggest hydropower plants – Kariba. The state-owned fixed line telecommunications 
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firm TelOne also recently received a loan of $98 million to improve its fibre optic 
network. In addition to the on-going and future projects, there are a number of projects 
that have already been completed. The National Defense College was a 3-year project 
that was completed way ahead of schedule and has become a symbol and a physical 
manifestation of the Look East policy.  
 
Despite these investments, the state of infrastructure in Zimbabwe remains poor. It only 
takes one turn off the newly renovated Airport Road to realise that the majority of the 
roads in the country have not received any attention in decades. It is not only the public 
infrastructure, which is in a poor state – the lack of power and water supply have caused 
manufacturing enterprises to produce less and therefore lose money. Patrick Chinamasa, 
Zimbabwe’s minister of finance and economic development, said that infrastructure 
remains the fundamental challenge to unleashing the country’ potential. He 
acknowledged that China has a significant role to play in sectors such as power supply 
and transportation, but Zimbabwe is seeking more value-added industries, such as 
processing raw materials in the country in order to revive its economy. Chinamasa said 
prior to Xi Jinping’s visit in December 2015: “For instance, we have coal, and if 
Chinese investors can bring in the equipment, then we may generate power to not only 
Zimbabwe, but other countries in this region” (Li and Zhao 2015). Mr. Chinamasa’s 
view may seem far fetched looking at Zimbabwe’s on-going power supply problems, 
but nevertheless the infrastructure development in Zimbabwe by China could turn out to 
be a blessing in disguise if both parties held to their own on the path to an even more 
mutually beneficial relationship. 
 
5.3.5. Soft power 
 
According to MOFCOM, Chinese culture and people-to-people exchanges in Zimbabwe 
achieved ‘splendid results’ in 2015. MOFCOM’s website lists a number of successful 
encounters and visits of Chinese cultural ambassadors to Zimbabwe, but of course 
makes no mention of how they were received. In February, the ‘Cultures of China, 
Festival of Spring’ art troupe made a visit to Zimbabwe, organized by the State Council 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the Shenzhen Municipal Singing and Dancing Troupe 
visited Zimbabwe, and participated in the art performance of the 20th Session of the UN 
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World Tourism Organization General Assembly and the inaugural ceremony of the 
Zimbabwean president, and the fourth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Legal 
Forum, which was held in Zimbabwe. The 13th Chinese medical team also arrived in 
Zimbabwe in 2015 and started its work, but it is not mentioned where the team has been 
stationed, how long they are staying or what they have expertise in. As elsewhere, 
education plays a major role in bringing the two countries and cultures together, so the 
Confucius Institute in Harare and the five Confucius Classrooms in Zimbabwe enjoyed 
greater influence, with an enrolment of nearly 800 students. Walls in Harare town centre 
are covered with posters inviting Zimbabweans to study in China and the Confucius 
Institute is actively recruiting students to learn Chinese. The newest shopping mall 
complex in Harare sports curved Chinese roofs, guardian lions and Chinese gates, and is 
complete with authentic Chinese restaurants, where one is served by Chinese-speaking 
Zimbabwean waitresses. 
 
Supermarkets in Harare now have Chinese food aisles and Chinese restaurants are 
popping up. Though these developments don’t seem to be aimed at Zimbabweans, but 
rather at Chinese expats living in the county in their thousands. Zimbabweans are 
slowly taking interest in Chinese culture, but for the time being are still very sceptical 
about China and the Chinese and the Chinese mall and restaurants remain rather empty 
with local customers. The two groups lead separate lives in the country with the Chinese 
living in compounds, and only venturing out to do their weekly shop, go to a restaurant 
or run errands. Their children are home-schooled or attend a mini school in someone’s 
house in the compound, where all the learning is done in Chinese. There are a few more 
adventurous Chinese people one can spot in the haunts of the locals, but these are only a 
handful and even they find it difficult to mix with the sometimes hostile locals. The 
reports of Chinese economic takeover have seriously damaged China’s soft power quest 
in Zimbabwe and made locals sceptical of China and the Chinese, however, this does 
not mean China cannot ‘win over Zimbabwean hearts and minds’ like it planned in 
conjunction with its foreign policy.  
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6. Analysis 
 
China is often classed as a neo-colonial power and has become synonymous with the 
concept of neo-colonialism, but the term itself is rarely conceptualized and put into a 
theoretical framework. With the five characteristics defined in this thesis, neo-
colonialism can be applied or debunked more systematically and objectively. Using the 
independent variables and the five characteristics of neo-colonialism, I will aim to 
determine the scope and extent of Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa, followed by a 
country-specific analysis in the context of Zimbabwe. 
 
6.1. The extent of Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa 
 
China's increasing footprint in Africa has raised a number of questions to reflect on. The 
increasing cooperation can be an alluring opportunity or a terrifying threat, depending 
on how smartly Africa engages with Beijing and the types of instruments China chooses 
to use with a specific country or region. 
 
The five features of neo-colonialism are all evident in China’s activities on the African 
continent as a whole, however, to varying extents in different areas of cooperation in the 
fifty-four African states. While Western observers frequently attach the label of neo-
colonialism to China, Chinese officials and academia are keen to dispel China’s image 
as a neo-colonial power in Africa and adhere to a view whereby there are no losers in 
this relationship. Wang and Zou (2014) protectively state that allegations made by 
Western observers against China about neo-colonialism are not true. They contend that 
China’s ‘new frontier’ diplomacy helps African countries develop and nurture a 
mutually beneficial win-win situation. In response to accusations of resource 
exploitation, they argue that China’s high demand for raw materials has enabled these 
commodities to maintain relatively high prices and China is buying commodities at the 
world market prices as opposed to the old colonial powers that used to exploit African 
countries and their resources to their own advantage. Similarly, Liu Guijin, the Chinese 
government’s special representative to Africa stated in 2006: “China has no intention to 
undermine Africa’s democracy. China is working hard to build a socialist democracy 
and promote human rights and good governance at home…China is a responsible 
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major country in the world.” Speaking in Khartoum in February 2008, Liu Guijin went 
on to say: “We have never, and will never in the future, attach any kind of political 
conditions to these aid and development projects, because we think that providing 
assistance is just for the benefit of the people, it is not for political purposes, not for 
showing off to the outside world.” Indeed, China does not officially attach conditions to 
its aid and has become Africa’s biggest trading partner, which has benefitted many local 
industries, however, despite these displays of selfless friendship there are significant 
caveats to this South-South cooperation, which feature a number of neo-colonial 
characteristics. 
 
China is notoriously secretive in revealing the details of many of its business deals and 
development projects, but the officials always take advantage of announcing large aid 
packages and concessional loans to be allocated to African countries, amongst others, in 
order to build the country’s reputation domestically and abroad as a benevolent rising 
power. At the FOCAC meeting in South Africa in 2015 the Chinese premier Xi Jinping 
pledged $60 billion in support of African economies. Yet a number of observers remain 
sceptical: is the pledge symbolic, designed to preserve China’s political and diplomatic 
influence on the continent or is it a cohesive plan to ramp up relations (Thomas 2016). 
Whichever it is, it is necessary to remain vigilant when making observations about the 
Chinese involvement in Africa as the announcement does not necessarily mean it will 
be realised. These announced amounts don’t always come to fruition and little data and 
reliable reporting, monitoring and evaluation is available on the development projects 
China has invested in, thus painting a false or skewed picture of the real extent of 
Chinese aid. Brautigam (2015) found that there is a tendency to overestimate ‘almost 
everything’ China is doing in Africa. An announcement may be made where a company 
hopes to spend $2 billion. When they start, they realise it’s difficult for one reason or 
another and it gets scaled back, but the initial report about the $2 billion is still out 
there.  
 
Nevertheless, based on the figures and reports that are available, it is possible to resolve 
that the intention of China’s aid to Africa is not malignant, but certainly not altruistic 
either. China does not explicitly seek to use aid to influence the domestic politics of 
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African countries or dictate policies, but instead, it hopes to pave way for smoother 
business practices, access to raw materials, favourable trade terms, and to keep Chinese 
investments and staff safe on the continent. However, Chinese hefty aid packages are 
certainly not in exchange for nothing, but serve a greater purpose as outlined in China’s 
all-encompassing Africa policy, which sees development cooperation as one of the 
instruments through which to conduct its foreign policy and win favour from African 
leaders. A policy that has the power to influence another country remotely while 
opening doors for access to its natural assets and market share without any due tender 
processes or competition, could be termed as a neo-colonial practice.  
 
Chinese development assistance creates access to Africa’s natural resources and local 
markets, creates business opportunities for Chinese companies and employment for 
Chinese labourers, but at the same time, many of these projects have large African 
components and have made significant contributions to the local economies and 
societies. Admittedly, the gains are unequally distributed with Africa normally on the 
losing side. Despite the favourable terms and grand announcements of massive aid 
packages, the concessionary loans must be paid back, frequently with raw materials, and 
are regularly used to construct large infrastructure projects tied to Chinese companies; 
the foreign aid is often tied to Chinese contractors or access to natural resources. 
 
Chinese officials emphasize that China also provides aid to countries that are not rich in 
natural resources to defuse international criticism, however, China may have its eyes on 
other things these countries can deliver, such as their support for ‘one China’ policy, for 
China’s agenda at multilateral forums, and for China as a ‘responsible stakeholder.’ In 
this sense, China’s comprehensive, multi-dimensional agenda of its aid to Africa defies 
any simplistic categorization or assessment. African states do win from these projects, 
especially while Western aid is diminishing or tied to conditions that countries are not 
ready to fulfil, but the initially attractive Chinese propositions have made many states 
dependent on Chinese development cooperation and are indirectly forced to share their 
riches at heavily discounted terms and little revenue compared to China’s gains. 
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Thus, the relationship is noticeably unequal: Africa’s strategic importance for Beijing is 
low, however trade with China, its foreign aid and diplomatic ties are of utmost 
importance to many countries in Africa. While China is Africa’s largest trading partner, 
remarkably, China’s trade with Africa accounts for only 5% of the country’s global 
trade (Sun 2014). China’s primary foreign policy goals and interests are still based on 
its relations with the developed powers, particularly the US, EU and Japan. Power and 
Mohan (2010) argue that many African leaders welcome China nonetheless, because it 
is different to other interventionist industrial powers. But this is not the only reason: 
Chinese investment is so widespread and Chinese aid so sought after that many 
countries on the African continent would see an economic collapse if Chinese FDI and 
aid were to come to a sudden halt. The asymmetry, typical of a neo-colonial relationship 
is helping China keep Africa under its powerful yoke and many African states have 
become so dependent on China’s business and aid that they have no choice but to accept 
China’s terms. With China’s slowing economic growth, many African economic 
analysts have become nervous and wonder if is it smart for Africa to continue to largely 
depend on its largest trading partner. Songwe and Moyo (2012) suggest that in order to 
make the relationship more equal, African countries must articulate a comprehensive 
China policy, which would go beyond trade and would also regulate the treatment of 
workers, environmental standards and transparency rules, but this would come with the 
risk of losing China’s business. Besides, not all African states take issue with the way 
Chinese are doing business in their markets, nearly all leaders and officials of African 
states where China is strongly involved in have a degree of agency in these deals and 
reap considerable benefits from deals with China, so reaching a consensus on a China 
policy would prove very difficult indeed.  
 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang acknowledged hitches in the relationship when he 
visited four African countries in May 2014. He said: “There is a need to assure our 
African friends in all seriousness that China will never pursue a colonialist path like 
some countries did, or allow colonialism, which belongs to the past, to reappear in 
Africa” (French 2014). But at the same time, he also gave a nudge to African leaders 
not to meddle with Chinese investment and staff on the continent if they want to remain 
in the mutually beneficial relationship, which is not isolated from the events and 
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fluctuations that take place in the rest of the world. Caceres and Ear (2012) use an 
Eskimo proverb to sum up the relationship: ‘gifts make slaves just as whips make dogs:’ 
China locks resource-exporting countries and countries with lucrative new markets into 
a neo-colonial relationship, where China is the clear winner and Africa is left with 
billions of dollars aimed at development cooperation, which can end up in the pockets 
of the elite due to China’s non-interventionist policies and where African resources in 
conjunction with Chinese FDI are used to advance Chinese businesses, economy and 
diplomatic goals.  
 
Brautigam (2011) is one of the few Western scholars that supports the claim of mutual 
benefit when it comes to the relationship between China and Africa. She finds that 
China is genuinely interested in extending the lessons it learned from its own 
development to Africa. She aims do debunk the widespread view of the Chinese 
presence in Africa as neo-colonialism and shows that both Africa and China win from 
this South-South partnership. However, some commentators find this view rather naïve 
as it masks unequal exchanges between parties. Li Anshan, director of the Institute of 
Afro-Asian Studies and Centre for African Studies at Peking University also argues 
against Western powers’ accusations of China being a neo-colonial power in Africa: 
“This is indeed ironic, coming from Western countries talking about abuse of human 
rights, when they have committed relentless human rights abuses during their colonial 
periods…It is almost shameful for these countries to accuse China of human rights 
abuses, when they have committed much more atrocious acts in the past.” Zhao (2014) 
argues that China has lifted millions of people out of poverty without democratisation 
and China’s model of a strong government and its focus on economic growth is looked 
upon by many African leaders as an example to follow. Furthermore, she asserts that the 
economic woes of many companies and enterprises in African countries started long 
before China increased its exports there and such woes are largely the result of 
economic globalisation, so China could not be held accountable for this alone. 
 
Indeed, the lack of conditions and generous aid packages make China the perfect 
partner for many countries in the developing world, but despite their welcoming attitude 
and after years of ‘win-win’ partnerships, China seems to finally have realised that it 
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needs to improve the style and substance of its push into Africa in answer to 
international criticism and increasing condemnation by Africa’s civil society. For the 
African citizenry the engagement with China will be felt in the market presence of more 
and more Chinese products, which has the potential to prove a great business 
opportunity for local partners or a downfall of Africa’s small businesses, who simply 
cannot compete with China’s manufacturing capabilities. Chinese investments in 
infrastructure should in theory also influence the lives of ordinary Africans to the better 
and leave some budget funds to pay for civil servants’ salaries and provide better social 
services, but this has not yet played out in practice as the majority of newly built roads 
are not constructed with the citizens’ interests in mind, but are strategically placed to 
take resources out of the country and run businesses smoother. Therefore, as Sino-
African relations deepen, the effects and changes this cooperation creates in Africa must 
be considered from the point of views of various stakeholders. The relationship has 
proven to be very lucrative for the elite and government officials, but has not created 
much change for the average citizens in Africa, who are growing more and more 
restless with their governments’ dealings with China.  
 
6.2. The extent of Chinese neo-colonialism in Zimbabwe 
 
Although some analysts suggest that China’s foreign policy is changing with its 
growing role as a world power and they are paying more attention to concerns such as 
human rights, there are still important limitations (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008). 
China may have slightly changed its values when looking at its condemnation of Iran’s 
nuclear plan, increasingly bitter relations with North Korea and its condemnation of 
government crackdown in Burma. However, economic interests still remain paramount 
for China and the country does not share the West’s views about human rights, 
governance and democracy. In fact, China’s Africa policy makes no mention of human 
rights and China has never declared to have human rights or fighting corruption at the 
forefront of its agenda in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has become notorious for its 92-year 
old head of state, hyperinflation and the squandering of resources. In 2016, famine, 
hunger and yet another monetary crisis have entered the list of Zimbabwe’s woes. 
While a number of educated Zimbabweans are leaving the country for lack of 
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opportunities, more and more Chinese are moving to the country along with their 
businesses and to work on government-backed projects, which are all lubricated by 
Zimbabwe’s Look East policy.   
 
Zimbabwe adopted the policy after losing its traditional supporters in the West, 
especially the UK and the EU, with an aim to boost trade, get the country out of its 
economic slump and not to be completely isolated on the international arena, but also 
for the ease of doing business with China, the large concessional loans and grants, 
infrastructure projects and perks that many ZANU-PF officials directly benefit from. 
Indeed, Chinese activities are visible in Zimbabwe, especially near highly secured 
mining areas. While Chinese officials in Zimbabwe put the countries’ warm relations 
down to their historical friendship and fight against imperialism, the underlying aims of 
Chinese investment into Zimbabwe are to pave way for its companies, to access the 
country’s diamond, gold and copper reserves and to gather diplomatic support. 
Furthermore, Africa, including Zimbabwe with its vast resources and market potential, 
is not as critical for China as China is for the Zimbabwean economy, which gives China 
more flexibility in its Africa policy.  
 
Zimbabwe is not in any position to hold bargaining power over China at the moment 
with its lack of other business and development partners, while Beijing holds leverage 
over Mugabe and his government with their large financial resources, which Zimbabwe 
desperately needs. As such, this is a clear manifestation of neo-colonialism on China’s 
part: it is coaxing the local government into deals that favour China using infrastructure 
projects, concessional loans, grants and imports as bait. These activities are carried out 
by Chinese SOEs and POEs, whose activities are aided by deals the two governments 
have agreed on. Zimbabwe, with its Look East policy, evidently had agency in 
facilitating the current situation, which is not only economical exploitation, but also a 
strong soft power and cultural push from China to win over Zimbabwean hearts.  
 
Yet despite the clear inequality in the partnership, the relations between the two have so 
far been free of major disturbances thanks to a shared sense of historical victimisation 
by Western colonial powers and a common identity as developing countries, which 
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helps to keep diplomatic relations at bay. However, the financial dealings between the 
countries are no longer without differences of opinion. There is increasing criticism 
from Zimbabwean civil society, who are now realising that partnering with China has 
not lived up to expectations. Chinese companies have outsourced many value-added 
services from Zimbabwe, which has contributed to the country’s already high 
unemployment rate. This, coupled with unfounded rumours that Chinese companies 
only hire their compatriots, has created an almost blind hatred towards Zimbabwe’s 
Look East policy and many have started to criticise the government on these grounds.  
 
Citizens of Zimbabwe realise that they have missed out on the country’s diamond 
revenue, which has been misappropriated or gone to Chinese-owned businesses while 
Zimbabwe’s GDP remains at 14.2 billion USD, which is even lower than its 
neighbouring Mozambique at 16 billion USD (World Bank 2016). In order to dispel 
dissatisfaction, companies such as Anjin Investments, who have come under fire in 
Zimbabwean and global media for mistreating workers and not adhering to labour laws 
in Marange mines, have had to downsize their operations with the application of 
Zimbabwe’s indigenisation law by which all companies must have at least 51% local 
ownership. Chinese government is fighting back to regain the full control of Chinese 
companies’ operations in the country, and China with its much higher weight is likely to 
win this dispute. 
 
A report by a Zimbabwean NGO the Centre for Natural Resource Governance (2015) 
stated that mining in Zimbabwe is ironically associated with poverty. The law itself 
takes away community rights to land and gives them to mining companies. The 
government has adopted an extractivist model of development whereby development is 
hinged upon extraction and export of minerals, which in turn relies on demand from 
third parties such as China. The scaling up of mining activities vis-a-vis the absence of a 
strong mining law, institutional framework and political will to protect communities 
against displacements and other disadvantages brought about by mining mean more 
communities are going to be condemned to new poverty in the coming years. This 
means more mining conflicts are lined up for Zimbabwe, which may degenerate into 
violent conflicts, with or without Chinese involvement, thus placing a large amount of 
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responsibility on the Zimbabwean government, who are indirectly allowing Chinese 
mining firms to engage in neo-colonial practices. This has also enabled the coming in of 
corrupt mining syndicates that are not accountable to the people and state institutions 
but to their patrons who receive bribes in exchange for ‘protection’.  
 
China is flexing its muscles in Zimbabwe through investment, development aid, grants, 
business opportunities and soft power. Neo-colonialism is demonstrable in these 
activities and the interactions between the two parties are unmistakably asymmetrical 
with China on the ‘win’ side. However, whether or not China is prolonging Zimbabwe’s 
governance crisis and economic downturn is a more complex issue. Even though China 
is gaining more from the cooperation, Zimbabwe does not emerge as a clear ‘loser’ in 
this liaison: they have received millions of dollars in grants and been given large loans, 
the repayment of which China has cancelled in order to win more favour. Chinese 
funding and firms have built a number of roads in the country and despite their primary 
goal of taking resources in and out of the mines, they do serve the local areas in which 
they have been built. More and more Zimbabwean students receive Chinese 
scholarships and a number of locals have been employed in Chinese businesses to help 
them cope with the specifics of local culture and run smoother. Therefore it is fair to say 
that each party has won from the interaction, however, the gains are very unevenly 
distributed and will not help along the whole country’s development process.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
There continues to be a propensity to look at China-Africa relations from one of two 
polarised positions – China is seen as exploitative and neo-colonialist or as the great 
hope for a new era in the African development. The reality is somewhere in the middle, 
with the potential for deeper mutually beneficial relationships, but coexisting with some 
level of exploitation. Chinese investment provides new challenges for African countries, 
but also opportunities for a better positioning in the world market without Western 
conditions and sanctions. Chinese approach to cooperation with African countries is 
indeed unconventional and very different from the Western model of engagement with 
Africa, but that is not to say that exploitation and relentless self-gain are drawn into 
China’s foreign policy on the African continent.  
 
Chinese activities in Africa from development cooperation to business to soft power all 
portray elements of neo-colonialism, which are met with the willingness from African 
states to voluntarily enter into the relationship. China needs to expand its market, find 
resources and gain diplomatic support; African states need help with poverty reduction, 
infrastructure and increasing their say in international forums. Thus economic interests 
should not trump efforts to encourage good governance and transparency among 
African leadership. However, things become more complicated when a state finds itself 
dependent on Chinese aid and business with limited ways of protecting itself from a 
country with much larger economy and diplomatic sway.  
 
Based on the theory of neo-colonialism as outlined in this paper, there are irrefutable 
signs that China is a neo-colonial power in Africa. China is a new power on the 
continent, which has thus far been engaging with most African states without much 
opposition. This asymmetrical relationship is aided by African elites and some 
governments, who pave way for Chinese businesses and grant them favourable trade 
terms, which in turn make economies more and more dependent. This, coupled with the 
distribution of Chinese culture through media, education, retail and many other 
methods, has given reason to see China as a neo-colonial power on the African 
continent as a whole. Yet the fifty-four countries of Africa are all different and so is the 
extent to which they engage with China. Zimbabwe with its Look East policy and 
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shared history with China is exceptionally open to doing business with China, but with 
growing unrest and lack of trust in the government, it remains to be seen whether or not 
the ‘all weather friendship’ of China and Zimbabwe stays as warm as it is now. China is 
facing and will continue to face the same challenges as other countries do when 
investing in unstable regimes and considering continued Western support for oil 
producing and resource-exporting authoritarian governments, one should not expect 
China to carry the burden of such reforms in Africa. 
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9. Kokkuvõte 
 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks oli analüüsida Hiina Rahvavabariigi suhteid Aafrika 
mandriga ja Zimbabwe riigiga ning määrata kuivõrd võib Hiinat nimetada 
neokolonialistlikuks võimuks Aafrikas. Vaatluse all olid viis välispoliitilist meetodit, 
mille abil Hiina teostab oma välispoliitikat Aafrikas: arengukoostöö, ressursside-ja turu 
laiendamine, välismaised otseinvesteeringud, infrastruktuuri projektid ning pehme jõud.  
 
Nimetatud viie sõltumatu muutuja uurimiseks on töös analüüsitud nii empiirilisi 
tõendeid, mis põhinevad uurival ajakirjandusel, ametlikel kaubandusnäitajatel, avalikult 
kättesaadavatel andmebaasidel, kui ka Hiina ja Zimbabwe riiklikke poliitikapabereid, 
kohalike ja rahvusvaheliste liidrite arvamusi ja mõttekodade raporteid. 
 
Töö on üles ehitatud ressursi geopoliitika ning neokolonialismi teoreetilisele 
võrgustikule, kusjuures ressursi geopoliitika võimaldab Hiina-Aafrika suhteid vaadelda 
laiemas raamistikus ning neokolonialism tagab spetsiifilisema vaatepunkti. 
Neokolonialismi eripäraks on, et seda terminit kasutatakse väga tihti, eriti Hiina-Aafrika 
suhete kirjeldamisel, kuid neokolonialismi on harva defineeritud, mis teeb sellest pigem 
kirjeldava kui analüütilise termini. 
 
Kuna neokolonialismi teoorias ei ole hetkel ühtki väljakujunenud koolkonda, siis 
põhineb käesoleva töö teoreetiline raamistik erinevate teoreetikute arvamustel ning 
neokolonialismi kui termini ajaloolistel tunnuste abil tuletatud viiel kaasaegsel 
neopoliitika tunnusmärgil: (1) märgatav asümmeetria suhetes; (2) koloniseeritud riigile 
omastatav roll suhetes; (3) erinevad neokolonialismi elluviijad, kaasa arvatud 
rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid ja korporatsioonid; (4) eelnevate koloniaalsuhete 
eelduse puudumine ja (5) mõju levik mitmetes valdkondades, sealhulgas majanduses, 
kultuuris, hariduses ja muudes pehme jõu valdkondades.  
 
Hiina kui kasvav jõud maailmapoliitikas ja –majanduses ning riigi üha suurenev 
vajadus resursside järele on ajendanud paljusid uurijaid ja analüütikuid riiki nimetama 
neokolonialistlikuks. Samas kujutletakse Aafrika mandrit ja riike kui vahendeid, mille 
abil Hiina oma kasvu säilitab ning oma mõjuvõimu laiendab. Sellistest väidetest sai 
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tõuke ka käesoleva magistritöö probleemipüstitus. Hiina tõeline roll ning ulatus 
Aafrikas ei ole selge ning süüdistused neokolonialisms ei põhine tihti faktidel, vaid 
emotsioonidel.  
 
Zimbabwe kui ainus Aafrika riik, kes on ametlikult kasutusele võtnud nn. Idapoliitika, 
mille kohaselt toetub riik oma välispoliitikas ja majanduslikes ettevõtmistes pigem 
Hiina kui traditsiooniliste lääne koostööpartnertite poole. Zimbabwet ja Hiinat seob ka 
ajalooline võitlus kolonialismi vastu, kusjuures Hiina rahastas Zimbabwes siiamaani 
võimul olevat Robert Mugabe ZANU-PF parteid ning Zimbabwe omakorda toetas 
Hiinat rahvusvahelistel foorumitel ning avas oma uksed ja maapõue Hiina ettevõtetele. 
Siinkohal on ilmne üks viiest neokolonialismi omadustest: neokoloniseeritud riigi roll 
sellises suhtes. 
 
Töö leidis, et vaatamata suurenenud sooduslaenudele, abirahadele, infrastruktuuri 
projektidele, kaubanduse suurenemisele ja muudele hüvedele, on Hiina ja Aafrika 
suhted niivõrd ebavõrdsed, et Hiina on peamine võitja selles suhtes, milles 
Rahvavabariik näeb mõlemaid osapooli kui võitjaid. Asümmeetria kui neokolonialismi 
üks peamisi näitajaid, on Hiina ja Aafrika ning ka Hiina ja Zimbabwe suhetes väga 
ilmne. Ebavõrdsusest tingituna on mitmed Afrika riigid, sealhulgas Zimbabwe, sõltuvad 
nii Hiina arenguabist kui ka kaubandusest. See on eriti selge Zimbabwes, kes Euroopa 
Liidu ja USA sanktsioonide tõttu on sattunud majanduskriisi ning kelle 92-aastase 
presidendi juhitud valitsuses lokkab korruptsioon. Hiina kui Zimbabwe suurim 
koostööpartner veab aga riigist välja teemante, vaske, boksiiti ja kulda, millest saadud 
tulu ei lähe riigi ega rahva hüvanguks, vaid tihtipeale otse ametnike taskutesse. 
 
Lisaks leidis töö, et vaatamata kõikide neokolonialismi omaduste olemasolule Hiina 
suhetes Aafrikaga, ei ole senise koostöö jätkumine sarnasel kujul enam võimalik. Järjest 
enam sõna võttev Aafrika kodanikuühiskond nõuab oma osa riikide rikkustest ning 
võimul olevad omakasupüüdlikud valitsused on Hiinaga suhtlemisel ja kaubitsemisel 
üha enam ettevaatlikud, et mitte rohkem usutavust ja võimu kaotada. Mitmed Aafrika 
riigid, kaasa arvatud Zimbabwe, on hakanund Hiina tegevusele üha rohkem piire 
panema ning Aafrika riikides elavad hiinlased on üha rohkem kohalike poolt taunitud.  
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Kokkuvõtteks võib öelda, et Hiina ulatus kõigis 54 Aafrika riigis on erinev ning ka 
Hiina vastuvõtt Aafrika riikides ei ole muutumatult sama. Zimbabwe on oma  
Idapoliitika ja ühiste ajalooliste kogemuste tõttu erakordselt avatud koostööks Hiinaga, 
aga kasvav rahulolematus ja vähene usaldus valitsuse suhtes annavad märku 
muutuvatest prioriteetidest. Seega ei ole kindel kas Hiina ja Zimbabwe praegused 
soojad suhted jätkuvad samamoodi. Hiina seisab silmitsi samade probleemidega, mida 
kogevad teisedki riigid, kes investeerivad ebastabiilsetesse riikidesse. Arvestades lääne 
riikide jätkuvat toetust naftat tootvatele ja resursse eksportivatele autoritaarsetele 
valitsustele, ei tohiks eeldada, et koorem Aafrika reformimiseks peaks olema Hiina 
kanda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
